11/11/76

AIRTEL

TO: SAC, MIAMI

FROM: SAC, SAN JUAN [redacted] b6 b7C b7E

SUBJECT: [redacted]
JOSE BOSCH;
ITAR-BRIBERY
OO SJ

By way of background information for Miami, the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) was the party in power in Puerto Rico until the 11/4/76 elections. The Governor of Puerto Rico and the majority in both houses of the Puerto Rican Legislature were PDP members. Fomento is a large agency of the Puerto Rican Government which handles tourism and industrial development.

On 11/10/76 a reputable source, whose identity is set out in the San Juan file, advised that he was informed as follows:

In early 1976 the Bacardi Corporation which has a large rum distillery at Catano, Puerto Rico was extremely interested in a change of the tax laws of Puerto Rico which would be beneficial to Bacardi. Reportedly, JOSE BOSCH, who lives in the Bahamas and who is president or chairman of the board of the Bacardi Corporation, agreed to make a $300,000 donation to the PDP campaign fund if the tax law was changed to the benefit of Bacardi. Subsequently a bill did pass the Puerto Rican Legislature which changed tax regulations to the immediate benefit of the Bacardi Corporation and shortly thereafter [redacted] met at Miami, Florida with JOSE BOSCH and some other people unknown to the source. At that time BOSCH handed over $300,000 cash to [redacted] P.R. P.R. b6 b7C

(2) Miami
2 San Juan
[redacted] b6 b7C
(4)

166-7142

[redacted]

SJ 166-

SAN JUAN

AT SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO

Will await results of Miami's interviews and discuss with either the U. S. Attorney or a strike force attorney whether members of the Bacardi Board of Directors should be brought before Federal Grand Jury regarding the above allegation.

Because of election laws which require strict accountability for political donations, the next problem for the PDP was to account for the $300,000 which they had received. In approximately September, 1976 the PDP conducted a so-called day long telethon which was broadcast from the Isla Grande Airport at San Juan, Puerto Rico on an island wide television network. At this time the $300,000 received from BOSCH was co-mingled with funds legitimately raised and on the following day the PDP claimed that the telethon had raised one million dollars in donations. A news organization which had heard a rumor that illicitly obtained funds were included in the funds legitimately raised in the telethon made an inquiry of the Puerto Rican Electoral Court to determine if the political parties were required to identify donors of campaign funds raised at political rallies. The Electoral Court advised that funds raised at rallies are an exception to the requirement that political donors be identified and that all a party need do is report the total amount of money raised at such a rally.

The source stated that subsequent to the donation some members of the Board of Directors of the Bacardi Corporation in Miami learned of BOSCH's action and became quite disturbed. As a result the Directors made several internal changes in the Bacardi Corporation. Reportedly [redacted] was slated for a particularly influential position in the Bacardi Corporation, however the Directors saw to it that he did not get the planned position because of [redacted]

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LEAD

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Identify and interview the members of the Board of Directors of the Bacardi Corporation as to their knowledge regarding a $300,000 political contribution made to the PDP by JOSE BOSCH in return for the change in Puerto Rican tax laws which was favorable to Bacardi. If the Directors appear to be knowledgeable but reluctant to furnish information they should be advised of their legal obligation to come forward with any knowledge they may have regarding such an illegal transaction.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-29-2025 BY [redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

Miami, Florida
MAY 15 1969

CUBAN REBEL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA
[redacted]

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MM T-1, a Cuban refugee closely associated with anti-Fidel Castro activities in the Miami area, on May 9, 1969, furnished the following information:

Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) is an anti-Castro organization in Miami which has sponsored raids and infiltration missions to Cuba in the past.

[redacted] is a Cuban exile in Miami who [redacted] and later returned to Miami. Since that time, he has been closely associated with and working for RECE.

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On May 9, 1969, [redacted] a RECE official, said that [redacted] recently left the United States on another infiltration mission to Cuba to organize underground opposition to the present government of Cuba. He did not say when the mission left or how many persons went. [redacted] claimed that on May 8, 1969, he learned the mission failed and he presumed the infiltrators were captured when they approached the coast of Cuba. [redacted] said he and other RECE members were monitoring Radio Havana for a news announcement concerning this matter.

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MM T-2, a Cuban exile associated with the leadership of RECE, on May 13, 1969, advised that Jose Bosch, President of the Bicardi Rum Company in Miami, is a leading financial sponsor of RECE. On May 10, 1969, while Bosch and [redacted] were at a party, [redacted] mentioned that recently on either May 7 or 8, 1969, an infiltration mission had been sent to Cuba from Miami. The mission was to go to Baracoa, Oriente Province, Cuba, and consisted of four boats and fifteen men.

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[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

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CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

MAY 15 1969

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b7E

Title CUBAN REBEL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum, dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

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under the leadership of [redacted] All participants in the mission were members of the military section of RECE. The purpose of the mission was not sabotage or espionage but to make contact with certain anti-Castro forces in Oriente Province. [redacted] was going to solicit their assistance and would promise them material aid. He had with him a radio transmitter to give to these anti-Castro forces, so they would be able to communicate with RECE in Miami and advise of local conditions in Cuba. (C)

Bosch said that the operation had cost $15,000 but he was going to withhold all further financial support from RECE for military operations. He said he would continue donating money for RECE's political and propaganda activities. (C)

On May 10, 1969, [redacted] said that he had received rumors that all infiltrators had been either captured or killed. (C)

On May 12, 1969, [redacted] said he had received no further information concerning the mission. He felt certain it had failed and Radio Havana had not carried this news item in any radio broadcast. (C)

MM T-1 on May 13, 1969, advised that [redacted]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Miami, Florida

FEB 16 1968

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Re; REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO (RECE) (CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)

RECE is a Cuban exile organization maintaining headquarters at 1784 West Flagler Street, Miami.

MM T-1, a Cuban exile active in Cuban political matters for the past six years, advised that RECE has tried many different approaches for the unification of the different Cuban exile political groups, but their efforts have always failed. It has also failed at previous attempts to launch raids against the north coast of Cuba. RECE is one of the few organizations left which is able to maintain a headquarters and a newspaper, but lacks political figures capable of uniting the Cuban exile movement in the United States.

MM T-2, who has been involved in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past ten years, on November 27, 1967, advised that Miami Mayor STEPHEN P. CLARK proclaimed November 18 and November 19, 1967, as days to commemorate Cuban freedom fighters. The mayor invited the people of Miami to meet in front of the bust of Cuban patriot JOSE MARTI in Bayfront Park, Miami.

MM T-2 advised that the Mayor of Miami issued the following proclamation:

"WHEREAS: The Cuban Representation in Exile, RECE, is an organization created after more than 65,000 Cubans throughout the world were

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 11-23-98

ENCLOSURE

"consulted, therefore legitimately representing a large number of the Cuban people;

"WHEREAS: Ever since it was founded, RECE has demonstrated absolute integrity and complete patriotic dedication to the cause of Free Cuba, fighting incessantly to obtain the freedom of the fatherland of JOSE MARTI and to preserve the democratic freedoms and institutions of America;

"WHEREAS: On November 18 and 19, RECE will celebrate in Miami, its First General Congress of Delegations, with the attendance of Cuban exiles from other cities of the Free World;

"THEREFORE, I, STEPHEN P. CLARK, Mayor of the City of Miami, Florida, declare and proclaim Saturday, November 18 and Sunday, November 19, 1967, as DAYS OF THE CUBAN FIGHTER.

"In observance whereof I invite the citizens of Miami who love liberty, especially all Cuban exiles, to attend on Saturday, November 18, 1967, at 11 A.M., the ceremony of placing a floral offering before the bust of JOSE MARTI in Bayfront Park, as a tribute to the memory of the apostle of Cuban liberties.

"In testimony whereof I sign this document and affix the seal of the City of Miami.

"Given in City Hall, Miami, Florida, on this 15th day of November in the year of our Lord, 1967.

"STEPHEN P. CLARK

"Mayor"

* * *

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

FEB 16 1968

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Title REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO (RECE) (CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

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will strongly urge these political parties to adopt as part of their political platforms strong economic and social measures against the present Government of Cuba.

MM T-3 stated that RECE has as its main purpose the liberation of Cuba, and will continue to work through the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United States Government to bring about the overthrow of the present Cuban Government.

MM T-3 explained that RECE receives no aid from the United States Government, and the organization maintains itself from the contributions of Cuban exiles, and especially, from JOSE M. BOSCH, President of the Bacardi Rum Company.

MM T-1 on February 1, 1968, advised that when President BARRIENTOS of Bolivia was in Miami about one month ago, he declined RECE's suggestion to trade captured Cuban guerrillas for political prisoners in Cuba. However, when BARRIENTOS arrived in New York, he said he would trade some captured Cuban guerrillas for HUBER MATOS, a former FIDEL CASTRO supporter who has been in jail in Cuba for about the past six or seven years.

Later, Radio Havana announced that FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, Prime Minister of Cuba, said that he would trade one hundred prisoners in Havana for the remains of ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. However, there has been no further mention of this proposed prisoner exchange by either the Governments of Cuba or Bolivia.

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MM T-3, a Cuban exile [redacted] b6 b7C
[redacted] RECE, on December 29, 1967, [redacted] on economic and political matters affecting Cuba. RECE [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

MM T-3 on February 1, 1968, advised that RENE BARRIENTOS, President of Bolivia, stopped in Miami on his way to New York and Switzerland. [redacted] b6 b7C BARRIENTOS in Miami, [redacted]

[redacted]

RECE also proposed that BARRIENTOS come to Miami some time in the future, address Cuban exiles at a public rally, and be honored for his fight against Communism in Bolivia. BARRIENTOS advised that certain difficulties involving the United States Department of State, protocol, security measures, and other details would first have to be worked out, inasmuch as the Cuban exiles in the United States do not constitute a legal recognized government.

MM T-3 explained that at the present time, RECE is working on political proposals and drafts to submit to the Republican and Democratic parties at the forthcoming national conventions in Miami and Chicago. These proposals

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

Miami, Florida
April 23, 1968

Re: REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)
(RECE)
[redacted] b7E

Representacion Cubana Del Exilio (Cuban Representation in Exile) (RECE) is a Cuban exile organization maintaining headquarters at 1784 West Flagler Street, Miami.

On February 21, 1968, RECE issued a press release claiming that on February 17, 1968, a single RECE boat made an attack against Cuba. The boat allegedly shelled a sugar freight station at Nazabal Beach, Las Villas, Cuba, while the raiding party from the boat engaged nearby Cuban militiamen.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATIC

MM T-1, who is familiar with the membership and operations of RECE, on February 21, 1968, advised that JORGE MAS CANOSA, military leader of RECE, has been agitating for a policy of hit and run raids against Cuba. [redacted] was in possession of a 23 foot boat containing an inboard - outboard engine and some weeks ago it was taken over by [redacted] a RECE member, who operates under orders from MAS. This boat then had [redacted] and was painted green. b6 b7C

FLA

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATIC

On February 16, 1968, a 23 foot boat of the same description, painted blue and having false Florida Registration No. FL5436, was seen in the Straits of Florida with four men aboard and heading south. It was believed this boat is identical with the boat having

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DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
ON 11-23-98

ENCLOSURE [redacted]

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Re: REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)
(RECE)

[redacted] It was not known if this boat actually went on the raid or if the entire story by RECE was a hoax. b6 b7C

On February 21, 1968, MM T-2, who is associated with some of the members of RECE, advised that one of the members of RECE said that the story about a RECE boat conducting an attack against Las Villas, Cuba, was a complete hoax designed to raise Cuban exile morale as well as increase money donations to RECE by Cuban exiles.

MM T-3, a Cuban exile closely associated with the leadership of RECE, advised that until recently RECE has been politically and militarily inactive and the Cuban exile community has lost interest in this organization. RECE has needed some publicity to stimulate interest and a press release claiming an attack against Cuba would be helpful.

MM T-3 explained that [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

"The Miami Herald", a newspaper published daily at Miami, Florida, on February 27, 1968, contained an article stating that 42 Cuban exiles had gathered for a four-day "Think" session in Miami for a feasibility study of the Cuban situation from the refugee standpoint.

FLA CUBA

Among the sponsors of this session were JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH, head of the Bacardi Rum Company; [redacted] a prominent Cuban attorney; and [redacted] b6 b7C

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Re: REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)
(RECE)

This article reported [redacted] as stating that the purpose of the meeting was to put talents together to obtain an evaluation of the Cuban situation and to make certain recommendations. b6 b7C

[redacted] stated that the recommendations would deal with: (1) the ideology of a new free Cuba; (2) public relations and international relations; (3) action to free Cuba; (4) coordination of exiles and the funding of the coordination.

MM T-2, a Cuban exile closely associated with the leaders of several anti-CASTRO organizations, on March 5, 1968, advised that among some of the persons attending the above mentioned session were JOSE BOSCH, [redacted] and [redacted] This group stated they wanted some other independent anti-CASTRO organization to join in with them, and their purpose would be to examine the status of the exile movement, determine its potential, and attempt to supply funds for a unity movement. FLA CUBA b6 b7C

MM T-2 explained that the above mentioned group had contacted the majority of the larger independent anti-CASTRO organizations in Miami and invited them to join in these deliberations, but it is doubtful that they had any success.

MM T-3, a Cuban exile closely associated with followers of JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH, on March 5 1968, advised the above session was sponsored by RECE, an anti-CASTRO organization which maintains headquarters at 1784 West Flagler Street, Miami, and is sponsored by JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH.

MM T-3 said that it was felt by most anti-CASTRO organizations in Miami that the above meeting was

RE: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES

MM T-1 explained that the above-mentioned group had contacted the majority of the larger independent anti-CASTRO organizations in Miami and invited them to join in these deliberations, but it is doubtful that they had any success.

MM T-2, a Cuban exile closely associated with followers of JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH, on March 5, 1968, advised the above session was sponsored by the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE), an anti-CASTRO organization which maintains headquarters at 1784 West Flagler Street, Miami, and is sponsored by JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH.

MM T-2 said that it was felt by most anti-CASTRO organizations in Miami that the above meeting was another attempt by RECE to "capture" the Cuban exile community and interest them in that organization. MM T-2 said that the last attempt by RECE to obtain publicity was an announcement on February 21, 1968 that a RECE boat had gone on a raid against Cuba and a sugar warehouse had been attacked.

MM T-2 stated that RECE is continuing its efforts to be a spokesman group for the Cuban exile community and continuously comes up with gimmicks in an effort to attain this end.

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FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Miami, Florida
April 23, 1968

Title: REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO (CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE) (RECE)

Character: [redacted] b7E

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-23-98 BY # b6 b7C

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida
April 10, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

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b7E

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
[redacted]

"The Miami Herald," a newspaper published daily at Miami, Florida, on February 27, 1968 contained an article stating that 42 Cuban exiles had gathered for a four-day "Think" session in Miami for a feasibility study of the Cuban situation from the refugee standpoint.

Among the sponsors of this session were JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH, head of the Bacardi Rum Company; [redacted] a prominent Cuban attorney; and [redacted]

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This article reported [redacted] as stating that the purpose of the meeting was to put talents together to obtain an evaluation of the Cuban situation and to make certain recommendations.

[redacted] stated that the recommendations would deal with: (1) the ideology of a new free Cuba; (2) public relations and international relations; (3) action to free Cuba; (4) coordination of exiles and the funding of the coordination.

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MM T-1, a Cuban exile closely associated with the leaders of several anti-CASTRO organizations, on March 5, 1968, advised that among some of the persons attending the above mentioned session were JOSE BOSCH, [redacted] and [redacted] This group stated they wanted some other independent anti-CASTRO organization to join in with them, and their purpose would be to examine the status of the exile movement, determine its potential, and attempt to supply funds for a unity movement.

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DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
ON 11-23-98

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ENCLOSURE [redacted]

ENCLOSURE [redacted]

Re: REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)
(RECE)

another attempt by RECE to "capture" the Cuban exile community and interest them in that organization. MM T-3 said that the last attempt by RECE to obtain publicity was an announcement on February 21, 1968, that a RECE boat had gone on a raid against Cuba and a sugar warehouse had been attacked.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

JUN 21 1968

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CONFIDENTIAL

RE: REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)
(RECE)
[redacted]

Representacion Cubana del Exilio (Cuban Representation in Exile)(Rece) is a Cuban exile organization maintaining headquarters at 1784 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida.

MM T-1, a Cuban exile involved in Cuban revolutionary activities for the past six years, on May 15, 1968, advised that JOSE BOSCH, owner of the Bacardi Rum Company, continues to donate $5,000 a month to RECE but is against the organization's sponsoring any military operations against Cuba because the United States Government has put a ban against such raids at this time.

MM T-1 explained that [redacted] Cuba, Fla. b6
[redacted] RECE, has left the organization b7C
because of a policy disagreement with [redacted]
[redacted] and
advocating this policy has caused some factionalism inside the organization.

On June 11, 1968, JORGE MAS CANOSA advised that on June 10, 1968, RECE received a telephone call from their [redacted] who furnished the following information:

[redacted] who lives in Los Angeles, had a b6
[redacted] b7C
[redacted] On May 21, 1968, [redacted]
read an announcement in the Los Angeles newspapers that

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
ON 11-23-98

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ENCLOSURE [redacted]

REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO

MM T-2 explained [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

MM T-3, a Cuban exile with whom there has been [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

MM T-3 explained that there is little optimism and hope that this meeting will result in any agreements for political or military unity among these anti-CASTRO Cuban exile organizations.

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REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO

a peace group was going to meet at a certain address at Hollywood, California, [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

About sixty persons were at this meeting, said [redacted] saw photographs of ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARRA and FIDEL CASTRO RUZ on the walls.

A young fellow named [redacted] (last name unknown), a student from the San Francisco State College, stated he had just returned from Cuba and was showing motion pictures and slides of the accomplishments of CASTRO in Cuba. An [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

One of the persons attending this meeting said he was an Arab from Jordan and in an argument that followed, [redacted] Thereafter the people at this meeting left the residence and the meeting was terminated. b6 b7C

When Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY was assassinated in Los Angeles on June 5, 1968, the press carried a photograph of SIRHAN BISHARA SIRHAN. [redacted] claimed that SIRHAN was the same individual who attended the freedom group meeting at Hollywood, California, on May 21, 1968.

On June 12, 1968, RECE called a press conference at its headquarters, 1784 West Flagler Street, Miami, where this story was given to the press and wire services.

MM T-2, [redacted] on June 17, 1968, advised that [redacted] continues [redacted] for RECE, acting under the orders of JORGE MAS CANOSA. The organization previously had a 25-foot boat containing two 150 horsepower engines. This boat had [redacted] This boat disappeared and later showed up having false Florida registration number FL 5436AE. The present whereabouts of this boat is unknown. b6 b7C b7D

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SUMMARY FROM SPANISH

CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE
(RECE)
"How to Bring to an End the Communist Regime in Cuba"
Prepared For: Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C

***

CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE
(RECE)

21 Bell's Office Building
1784 W. Flagler-Miami, Florida 33135

Telephone: Franklin 1-1722
P.O. Box 1898, Miami,
Florida 33101
February 17, 1969

Executive Members:

[redacted] b6 b7C

Jorge Mas

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-24-98 BY [redacted]

Financial Committee:

Jose M. Bosch (President)
[redacted] (Executive Secretary)

Accountant:

[redacted]

Census and Statistics:

[redacted]

To: [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

From: Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE)

Subject: How to Bring to an End the Communist Regime in Cuba

ENCLOSURE

INTRODUCTION

The whole Hemisphere, without excluding the United States, has felt the violent impact of communist agitation and subversion, coming from the formidable sanctuary and base constituted by the Island of Cuba. The lack of political stability of the Latin American nations and the slowness of their economic development and social progress is partly the result of ten years of continuous Castro-communist intervention in the internal affairs of the countries of America. The tactics vary and take different shapes, according to the local circumstances and different characteristics of each nation. The guerrillas in the mountains, the organized violence in urban zones, the infiltration in the universities and governmental structures and the looting and agitation in the cities, under the pretext of racial struggle have been, among other things, tactics and procedures that were organized, encouraged or directed from Havana. Something must be done to eradicate communism from the very heart of America.

IN EXILE

The principal reason for the Cuban exile is the fact that Cuba has not been liberated in these past ten years. The communist regime, though weakened by the terrible mistakes in its doctrine, in its political thesis, in its economic plans and inspite of the resistance of the majority of the Cuban people, has been able to stay in power because of the complicity of the countries of the Hemisphere which have practiced, up until now, a contemplative and indulgent policy toward the Cuban communist government.

Some of the most serious frustrations of the Cuban exile have been:

a. The lack of solidarity with and understanding of the Cuban cause by the North American authorities.

b. The unfulfilled promises of Giron Beach.

c. The no-invasion compromise as a consequence of the Kennedy-Khrushchev relations during the October 1962 Crisis.

d. The persecution of Cuban patriots that intend to risk their lives in armed struggle against communism.

SAC, Miami [redacted] 3/12/69

Director, FBI [redacted]

1 - Mr. Nasca

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REPRESENTACION CUBANA DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)(RECE)

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-24-98 BY [redacted]

ReBulet 2/27/69.

Attached for Miami are single copies of two documents in the Spanish language which were furnished to the Bureau on 2/26/69 by the Department of State via liaison channels. These documents bear the following titles:

1. Representacion Cubana Del Exilio (RECE)
"Como derrocar al Regimen Comunista de Cuba"
Preparado para: Mr. [redacted]

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2. Representacion Cubana Del Exilio (RECE)
Informe Confidencial
Preparado para: Mr. [redacted]

Note that page four of the first document listed above is missing. Since these documents were originally furnished by Mr. [redacted] who is the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the Miami area, it is suggested that the missing page be obtained from his office locally.

MAILED 24
MAR 11 1969
COMM-FBI

There are attached for your assistance two copies of a translation of the first document which was prepared by the Translation Section of the Bureau.

The second document is presently being translated at the Bureau and when completed it will be made available to your office.

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Enclosures - 4 ST 102 [redacted]

VHN:sed (4)

REC-3

NOTE: Captioned anti-Castro organization has reportedly recently infiltrated group into Cuba. Miami Office instructed to check this out by the referenced letter.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Cotter
Ele. Room
Ingram
Kindy

51 MAR 21 1969

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

51 MAR 12 1969

In view of the above-mentioned criteria, we propose to the government of the United States:

In the political sense -

That relations and a close communication be established between high-ranking officials of the United States Government and representatives of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE), which is known for its integrity and dedication to the Cuban cause and has the respect of all Cubans. In order to avoid the repetition of past errors, the political structure of the Cubans in Exile MUST NOT HAVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES. If such a relationship can be established between the North American Government and the people of Cuba, several projects and possible solutions could be studied, as well as matters of common interest to both.

Another advantage would be the strengthening of the Cubans' fighting morale, knowing that the United States is willing to listen and has established a basis of mutual respect with genuinely democratic representatives of the people of Cuba.

The provisional government that will substitute the communist regime will be democratic and based on the most absolute respect of freedom, democratic proceedings and economy and social justice. This provisional government would immediately began to "de-communize" Cuba, free political prisoners, establish a regime based on the statements made in the previous paragraphs and take measures to lead the development of the country to a complete and absolute democracy in the least possible time, through the election of its own government officials, etc.

It would also be convenient for the representatives of the people of Cuba to have the solidarity of other American countries, which must offer their moral support to a people who, belonging to the American community, totally lacks solidarity ties and is a victim of misfortunes, at the same time being ignored and forgotten by the governments of America. Unfortunately, and as a consequence of the American leadership of the Continent, no Latin American country will offer its solidarity to the representatives of the Cuban people until the United States takes the initiative and re-establishes ties, non-existent today, with the people of Cuba.

In the military sense -

To have a high-ranking liaison official between

the North American Government and the RECE, who will know the plans for the liberation of Cuba.

That this collaboration be cautious, so that the Cubans will be the only ones responsible for the efforts, as far as the fighting is concerned, to liberate Cuba.

To have an adequate selection of personnel to be used in the organizational tasks and the contacts that RECE has established with the men inside the Island, in order to achieve the ESSENTIALLY INTERNAL solution that we desire.

Special emphasis on the fact that ALL efforts must be ALL OF IT Cuban. The idea is that the Cubans on the Island will have the assurance that the plans are directed by Cubans who are running the same risks as they are on Cuban territory.

The North American military aid or collaboration, which is of vital importance, should be limited to the necessary logistical support: supplying weapons for Cuban combatants, as well as equipment, means of transportation and communication, so that they will not be stranded on Cuban territory once the struggle begins.

The American participation would be:

a. Logistical support

b. Supplying intelligence

c. General technical supervision

The Cuban tasks would be:

a. Supplying the human factor

b. Establishing internal contacts in Cuba

c. Assuming the responsibility of these contacts

d. Planning the general strategy

e. Directing the ultimate development of fighting plans.

CONCLUSIONS

In this Memorandum, we have expressed our opinion, our thesis, our points of view concerning the Cuban communist regime and the relations that should exist between the United States and Cuba, on a basis of mutual respect and consideration. With the help of the United States, the most serious conflict of the western hemisphere may be solved: the Cuban conflict.

CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE

(signed)

[redacted] b6 b7C

(signed)

[redacted]

(signed)

Jorge Mas

(signed)

[redacted] b6 b7C

(signed)

[redacted]

e. The confiscation of weapons and watercraft.

f. The lack of conversation and relations between the government of the United States and legitimate representatives of free Cubans.

Another reason for the existing crisis between the people of Cuba and the government of the United States is the indiscriminate utilization of Cuban citizens by agencies of this country without having a relationship of respect and common interests, based on serious and definite plans to uproot Castro. Another piece of evidence of this crisis is the fact that, on many occasions, officers of the Cuban Army and officials of Castro's government have established contact and initiated conversations with leaders of the Cuban exile community and not with representatives of the government of the United States and because of a lack of trust.

CUBAN SOLUTION

As a matter of principle, and of firm convictions, it is our opinion that the Cuban problem should have A FUNDAMENTALLY CUBAN SOLUTION. A Cuban solution means that the fall of the Cuban communist regime must be the result of the effort of the Cubans.

(Page four missing)

...need the support and solidarity of the Cubans that are fighting from abroad. Seeing this combination of forces, the United States should have a more understanding policy that will allow the success of this relationship between the Cubans on the Island and those abroad that wish to support and join the ones that are fighting in Cuba and whose resources are low. The United States should not place obstacles in front of this combination of effort.

We only wish to have cooperation from the North American government in a merely logistical aspect because we understand that for the United States, for the future of Cuba and for all America it would be more beneficial to gain the freedom of Cuba without a political and military intervention on the part of the United States, which would be harmful to the ideals and destiny of the people of Cuba and to the inter-american principles and interests of the United States.

RE: REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO

contacts with him. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

MM T-1 on March 14, 1969, advised that in October, 1968, RECE infiltrated Cuban exile [redacted] into Cuba and [redacted] later returned to Miami. FBI WORKS CLOSELY WITH SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

MM T-1 stated that RECE was planning to re-infiltrate [redacted] into Cuba but [redacted] decided to wait until July or August, 1969, to put the mission into effect. [redacted] said that the infiltration would be made by small boat and the best weather and sea conditions for such a mission would be in July or August, 1969. b6 b7C

MM T-1 advised that at the present time [redacted] was closely associated with RECE, was working at RECE headquarters and that RECE would financially sponsor this mission in return for any political propaganda or publicity RECE may obtain from the mission.

MM T-3, [redacted] b3 b7E

[redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Miami, Florida
April 23, 1969

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Re: REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)
(RECE)

RECE is a Cuban exile organization maintaining headquarters at 784 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida.

MM T-1, a Cuban exile active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past six years, advised that FLA b6 b7C also known as JOSE BOSCH, head of Bacardi Rum Company, who contributes $5,000 a month to RECE, is the FLA RECE. MAS contends that RECE should continue to sponsor infiltration missions against Cuba. BOSCH and RECE, he no longer visits the RECE Office, although he is in contact with the organization.

MM T-2, who has been active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past seven years, on March 11, 1969, advised that b6 b7C and on March 11, 1969, was contacted by some American mercenaries from Miami, Florida. in conversation, stated that he had contacts with U. S. Government officials in Washington, D. C. and if the U. S. Government would authorize it, to mercenaries or Cuban exile revolutionaries.

stated that he knew JORGE MAS CANOSA, military chief of RECE in Miami and indicated he had had numerous

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Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED BY
ON 11-25-97

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-29-2025 BY: [redacted]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
11-25-97

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

Miami, Florida

JUN 30 1969

8-24-11
Classified by [redacted]
Declassify on: GADR [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

FOI/PA # 270,471
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 8-20-86 INITIALS

RE: REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE) (RECE)

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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[redacted] (X)

MM T-1, a Cuban refugee closely associated with anti-FIDEL CASTRO activities in the Miami area, on May 9, 1969, furnished the following information: (X) (U)

Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) is an anti-CASTRO organization in Miami which has sponsored raids and infiltration missions to Cuba in the past.

FLA.

[redacted] b6 b7C

is a Cuban exile in Miami who in [redacted] and later returned to Miami. Since that time, he has been closely associated with and working with RECE. (X) (U)

On May 9, 1969, [redacted] recently left the United States on another infiltration mission to Cuba to organize underground opposition to the present government of Cuba. He did not say when the mission left or how many persons went

FLA

[redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] said he and other RECE members were monitoring Radio Havana for a news announcement concerning this matter. (X) (U)

MM T-2, a Cuban exile associated with the leadership of RECE, on May 13, 1969, advised that JOSE BOSCH, President of the Bacardi Rum Company in Miami, is a leading financial (X)

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

S E C R E T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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[redacted] b3 b7E

ENCLOS

XEROX
AUG 20 1969

REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)(RECE)

FLA- SECRET

JOSE

sponsor of RECE. On May 10, 1969, while BOSCH and [redacted] were at a party, [redacted] mentioned that recently, on either May 7 or 8, 1969, [redacted] All participants in the mission were members of the military section of RECE. [redacted]

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BOSCH said that the operation had cost $15,000 but he was going to withhold all further financial support from RECE for military operations. He said he would continue donating money for RECE's political and propaganda activities. (X)

On May 10, 1969, [redacted] said that he had received rumors that all infiltrators had been either captured or killed. (X)

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On May 12, 1969, [redacted] said he had received no further information concerning the mission. He felt certain it had failed and Radio Havana had not carried this news item in any radio broadcast. (X)

MM T-1, on May 13, 1969, advised that [redacted] said an [redacted]

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b7C

On May 13, 1969, [redacted] advised that he had (X)(4)

FLA-

SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

SECRET

no first-hand information concerning the infiltration mission into Cuba and was not in a position to make any comments on it. (S)(U)

He said news items appeared in the "Evening Star" newspaper, Washington, D. C., and the "Miami News," Miami, on about May 10, 1969, concerning the failure of the infiltration mission. [redacted] said RECE had issued no press report on the mission and he did not know the source of information used for these news reports. (S)(U) b6 b7C

On May 20, 1969, [redacted] for RECE, advised that RECE did not want any publicity concerning the infiltration mission and did not know the complete details of what happened after the infiltraters landed in Cuba. He explained that they attempted to land on the south coast of Oriente, Cuba, near the Guantanamo Naval Station and it was rumored that all members of the mission had been wounded, captured or killed. (S)(U) FLA

[redacted] said he was interested in ascertaining where the story originated that appeared in the Washington "Evening Star" and he planned to contact that newspaper and ask them where they received their information. (S)(U) b6 b7C

On May 20, 1969, [redacted] an official of RECE, advised that RECE was, indeed, responsible for the infiltration mission and the mission was not sponsored by any agency of the United States Government. [redacted] said RECE had little hope that the infiltraters were still alive and not in jail in Cuba. [redacted] Cuban refugees. He interviewed some refugees from Oriente Province, Cuba, who claimed they saw consideral mobilization and movement of the Cuban Army early in May, 1969, in Oriente Province, Cuba. The refugees said that later the situation went back to normal and they presumed some infiltraters had landed in Cuba and had been captured by Cuban Government forces. These refugees said that inasmuch as the Cuban press made no mention of the infiltration mission, they presume the infiltraters had been killed. (S)(U)

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

JUN 30 1969

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Title REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO (CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE) (RECE)

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Miami, Florida

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~

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REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)(RECE)

SECRET

between Miami and Haiti and the Dominican Republic. These vessels pass close to the coast of Oriente Province, Cuba. [redacted] said on the last infiltration mission, the infiltraters were on one of [redacted] boats and were let off near the coast of Cuba. RECE feels that it was bad luck the group was captured and there was no reason to believe the Cuban Government knew they were coming. (S)(U)

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MM T-3, a Cuban exile associated with the membership of RECE, on May 23, 1969, advised that on May 14, 1969, [redacted] members of RECE, said they had not received any information from Cuba concerning the fate of the infiltration mission but they felt certain that the infiltraters were either captured or wounded. (C)

FLA

SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

MM T-4. [redacted]

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[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

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REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)(RECE)

(S)



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(S)

On June 9, 1969, MM T-1 advised that RECE has now suspended all plans for further military activities. (U)

MM T-1 explained that RECE has never had plans for recruiting men for military operations in Cuba. RECE has always contacted organized military anti-CASTRO groups who previously have been involved in attempts to raid and infiltrate the coast of Cuba. When an agreement is made with one of these groups it is agreed that RECE will finance the mission in return for the right to issue all press releases and take credit for the mission. RECE has done this in the past and expects to continue doing so in the future. RECE has often been criticized by other exile groups of being a political organization attempting to act as the spokesman for Cuban exiles in the United States. To offset this, they have sponsored military operations in the past using other groups to actually conduct the military missions. (U)

MM T-1 said that RECE does not recruit individuals for operations against Cuba but rather makes agreements with (U)

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existing militant military groups how have had past experience in this type of activity. (S) (U)

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REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)(RECE)

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"Libertad," a Spanish-language newspaper published in Miami, Florida, May 21, 1969 issue, carried a RECE press release dated May 15, 1969. This press release said that RECE has been developing a plan for military activities in Cuba. Various groups of fighters from RECE have been and still are in Cuba. RECE takes responsibility for the operation and for security reasons, RECE would not publish the names of persons involved in these missions.

On May 22, 1969, MM T-1 advised that [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] refugees to Miami. [redacted] interviews these refugees about conditions in Cuba. (S) (U)

MM T-1 explained that these refugees probably describe conditions in Cuba as being worse than they are to justify their defections. [redacted] presumes there is a large anti-CASTRO force in Cuba, the overthrow of Prime Minister FIDEL CASTRO RUZ is imminent, and the time is opportune to organize an insurrectional force. As a result, [redacted] is in favor of continuing infiltration missions. (S) (U)

The young men in the military section of RECE are treated as patriots and have a certain amount of prestige among other Cuban exiles. They are anxious to continue missions against Cuba and attempt to organize an underground in Cuba. (S) (U)

Older and more mature exile leaders feel these missions have no chance to succeed because of the effectiveness of the Cuban Army and civilian patrols. Exile leaders feel that RECE officials are morally wrong in allowing these young men to go on missions which have no chance to succeed and death and imprisonment await these infiltraters on their arrival in Cuba. (S) (U)

[redacted] is a good friend of [redacted] FLA - b6 b7C

[redacted] (S) (U)

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RE: REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

MM T-3, a Cuban exile active in Cuban revolutionary matters, on January 6, 1970 advised that JORGE MAS CANOSA, military leader of RECE stated he would not publicly oppose TORRIENTE's plan for unification but that RECE would not give TORRIENTE's unity movement any economic or military aid. MAS said that because RECE is a coordinating organization it would expect to control any military activities sponsored by TORRIENTE's group. MAS said he had discussed this matter with several other leading members of RECE and they were in accord with his thinking. (C)

7/A. Cuban

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

MM T-3 on January 19, 1970 reported that MAS said that in the near future officers of RECE were going to meet with JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH, the financial supporter of RECE, to decide whether or not RECE would back TORRIENTE's unity movement. MAS said that he favored not supporting it and that RECE should continue as an independent organization (C)

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On January 12, 1970 MM T-1 advised that on January 10, 1970 TORRIENTO held a meeting at 7730 S. W. 31st Street, Miami, Florida concerning his going ahead with a plan to overthrow the present government of Cuba. [redacted] of RECE attended this meeting but it was clear that his being there did not mean that TORRIENTE had the support or backing of RECE. (C)

MM T-4 who has been involved in Cuban revolutionary activities for the past six years on January 27, 1970 advised that RECE continues to be undecided whether or not it will give its support to TORRIENTE. The officers of RECE generally feel that TORRIENTE has a chance to succeed but that if RECE does not support him RECE might be criticized by the Cuban exile communities in Miami.

MM T-4 explained that at the present time RECE has no plans for any military operations against the government of Cuba.

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DATE 07-29-2025 BY [redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

Miami, Florida
February 11, 1970

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RE: REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)
(RECE)
[redacted]

Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) is an anti-CASTRO organization with headquarters in Miami, Florida. It has sponsored military missions against Cuba in the past.

B. APPROX 1907 9/A Cuba

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

MM T-1, who has been active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past five years, on December 22, 1969 advised that on December 15, 1969 JOSE DE LA TORRIENTE held a meeting at the Universal Book Store in Miami for the purpose of meeting with Cuban students who attend the University of Miami. Other persons also attended the meeting, including [redacted] an influential and leading member of RECE. The purpose of the meeting was to promote unity among the different Cuban exile organizations in Miami, Florida and the United States. (C)

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MM T-1 explained that TORRIENTE is a 66-year-old Cuban national who has been trying to establish unity among Cuban exiles in the United States. So far he has been able to obtain pledges from the majority of leading Cuban exile political figures. The purpose of his unity movement is to unite all Cuban exiles in a massive effort to overthrow the present government of Cuba. (C)

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION 9/a

MM T-2, who has been active in Cuban exile political matters for the past six years, on December 22, 1969 advised that on December 21, 1969 [redacted] at RECE headquarters, said he did not see any likelihood of military or political activity by RECE for the immediate future. (C)

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12-1-97
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

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DATE 07-29-2025 BY [redacted]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

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JAN 2 4 1972

RE: REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE)
(RECE)

Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) is an anti-CASTRO organization with headquarters in Miami, Florida. Although RECE is basically a political group, it has sponsored military missions to Cuba in the past.

MM T-1, a Cuban exile closely associated with RECE members, on August 10, 1971 advised that JORGE MAS continues to be a member of the Executive Board of RECE but at that time was more interested in trying to establish a small business.

MM T-1 explained that MAS had been in contact with the Small Business Administration hoping to obtain a loan to start a textile printing process business in the Miami area. However, the Small Business Administration as of that time had not approved MAS' application for a loan.

MM T-2, who is closely associated with the leadership of RECE, on November 17, 1971 advised the organization continues to maintain its offices and headquarters at 1784 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida, and continues publication of its bi-monthly newspaper "RECE." The newspaper has a new item in it which contains an insert entitled "International News." This insert reports on failures of international communism in Latin America. "RECE" urges readers to send this insert to their families and friends inside Cuba.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

12-2-97
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

JAN 2 4 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Title **REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO (CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE) (RECE)**

Character

Reference **is made to memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE) (RECE)

Some of the Cuban exile anti-communist organizations in the Miami area such as Alpha 66, Brigade 2506, and RECE have participated in these discussions.

MM T-3 opined that nothing would become of these discussions and that they have been periodically considered by these groups in the past.

MM T-3 on December 6, 1971 reported that on the previous day, Abdala sponsored a demonstration in Bayfront Park, Miami, Florida, wherein several hundred people attended. MM T-3 explained that although RECE refused to participate in this demonstration, a number of RECE members were actually in attendance.

MM T-3 said that Abdala is a Cuban exile youth group in the Miami area and consists mainly of high school and college students.

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RE: REPRESENTACION CUBANO DEL EXILIO
(CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE) (RECE)

MM T-2 reported that at the present time RECE had no significant political activity or plans to sponsor any military action against Cuba by independent anti-CASTRO militant groups.

RECE has taken the position that JOSE TORRIENTE currently has all the attention of the Cuban exile press and the Cuban exile community in the Miami area, but will eventually fail in his efforts to launch a military invasion against Cuba and will become an obscure figure.

RECE then plans to again become active and be the spokesman for the Cuban exile community in the United States.

It is noted that JOSE ELIAS TORRIENTE AJURIA formed a Cuban exile unity movement in December, 1970, and since that time has collected a large amount of money and promised Cuban exiles he would launch an invasion of Cuba.

MM T-2 continued that JOSE BOSCH, head of the Bacardi Rum Company, with headquarters in Miami, Florida, continues to contribute money to RECE and a portion of this money is periodically spent to help support the family members of the ill-fated [redacted] expedition against Cuba.

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It is noted that [redacted] and nine other Cuban exiles in May, 1969, participated in an infiltration mission into Oriente Province, Cuba. They were subsequently all captured or killed by the government of Cuba.

MM T-3, a Cuban exile closely associated with members of RECE, on December 2, 1971 advised that there had been recent discussions by a number of Cuban exile groups in Miami concerning the possibility of moving their military operations to the islands in the Caribbean or to Costa Rica.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 19 1975

NR002 SJ CODE

10:51 PM NITEL 2-19-75 JXC

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
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Ident. ____
Inspection ____
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Spec. Inv. ____
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Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-11-83 BY [redacted]

REC-5

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN JUAN (174-565) (P)

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (2), BACARDI RUM CORPORATION, CATANO, PUERTO RICO, JANUARY 31, 1975, EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES, OFFICE OF ORIGIN: SAN JUAN.

ON [redacted] MET WITH ALDO VERA SERAFIN AND [redacted] BOTH WHO ARE KNOWN CUBAN EXILES WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN MIAMI AND PUERTO RICO. AT THIS TIME VERA, BEING THE MAIN SPOKESMAN, MADE AVAILABLE A LETTER ADDRESSED TO MR. JOSE BOSCH, PRESIDENT, BACARDI CORPORATION. THE LETTER, WHICH WAS SIGNED ORLANDO BOSCH, CATANO, PR. A KNOWN ANTI-CASTROITE AND LEADER OF ACCION CUBANA (CUBAN ACTION) (AC), CUBA PR. A CUBAN EXILE GROUP WHICH HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR BOMBINGS OF CUBAN EMBASSIES IN 1974, STATED THAT JOSE BOSCH WAS BEING ASSESSED ON BEHALF OF AC FOR A CONTRIBUTION OF $200,000 "TO ERADICATE COMMUNISM FROM CUBA".

EX-110 174-5899-11

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

FEB 26 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

[redacted] BUREAU FILE [redacted]

ORLANDO BOSCH, BUREAU FILE [redacted]

IN REGARDS TO CAPTIONED MATTER SAN JUAN WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH [redacted] REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL CONTACTS BY VERA OR [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
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END.

~~HOLD PLS~~

~~RECD 001 002~~

~~DCW FBIHQ~~

LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. CONSEQUENTLY THE ANSWER WAS NO. DURING

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] ADVISED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS THAT JOSE BOSCH REFUSED TO MAKE ANY TYPE OF DONATION TO ORLANDO BOSCH AT THIS TIME WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT JOSE BOSCH FELT THAT ORLANDO BOSCH WAS NOT THE WRITER OF THE LETTER IN QUESTION INASMUCH AS THE WRITER SIGNED THE LETTER ORLANDO BOSH INSTEAD OF BOSCH. [redacted] ALSO ADVISED THAT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO ORLANDO BOSCH WAS ARRESTED IN VENEZUELA AND THAT AT THIS TIME WROTE A PERSONAL HANDWRITTEN LETTER TO JOSE BOSCH REQUESTING MONIES TO HELP HIM OUT OF THE ARREST SITUATION THAT HE FOUND HIMSELF IN. AT THIS TIME JOSE BOSCH PROVIDED ORLANDO BOSCH WHO WAS IN VENEZUELA WITH $1,000.

No Loc.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

REFERENCE SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU DATED FEBRUARY 10, 1975, AND BUREAU TELETYPE TO SAN JUAN DATED FEBRUARY 11, 1975.

ALDO VERA SERAFIN, BUREAU FILE [redacted] b3 b7E

MEETING AND VERA ADVISED THAT THE MONEY WAS NEEDED MOST URGENTLY IN MARCH PRIOR TO SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER'S MEETING WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN BUENOS AIRES. VERA WAS NOT SPECIFIC AND APPEARED TO HAVE FELT THAT HE SAID MORE THAN HE WANTED TO REGARDING THE URGENCY OF ACQUIRING THE NEEDED $200,000.

[redacted] b7E

[redacted] ADVISED BUREAU AGENTS, AFTER THE ABOVE MEETING WITH VERA AND [redacted] THAT JOSE BOSCH REFUSES TO CONTRIBUTE THE $200,000 AND [redacted] WILL MAKE THIS DECISION KNOWN TO VERA ON FEBRUARY 18, 1975. AT THIS TIME VERA REQUESTED THAT [redacted] TELEPHONICALLY NOTIFY HIM OF JOSE BOSCH'S DECISION AS TO WHETHER HE WILL OR WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE THE MONEY. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D b7E

AT THIS TIME [redacted] ADVISED THAT HE HAD MET WITH MR. JOSE BOSCH AND HAD GIVEN HIM THE LETTER IN QUESTION. [redacted] FURTHER ADVISED VERA THAT JOSE BOSCH STATED THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO MAKE THE CONTRIBUTION AS HE WOULD BE BREAKING THE NEUTRALITY

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-29-2025 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida

MAY 15 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b3
b7E

RE: EJERCITO DE LIBERACION CUBANO (ELC)
(CUBAN ARMY OF LIBERATION)
(HEADED BY HIGINIO "NINO" DIAZ ANE)
[redacted]

HIGINIO "NINO" DIAZ ANE, 3619 NW 2nd Street, Miami, Florida, is the leader of the Cuban Army of Liberation (ELC), a small anti-CASTRO organization having members in Miami, Florida and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

MM T-1, a Cuban exile active in Cuban exile revolutionary activities during the past five years, [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

DIAZ indicated that he had recently been in contact with [redacted] who is a close friend and associate of JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH, head of the Bacardi Rum Company in Miami, and indicated he may have received some support from BOSCH. DIAZ said [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

MM T-2, a Cuban exile who is frequently in contact with DIAZ, on April 25, 1968, [redacted]

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Group 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

b3
b7E

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

Miami, Florida

MAY 15 1968

b3
b7E

Title EJERCITO DE LIBERACION CUBANO (ELC)
(CUBAN ARMY OF LIBERATION)
(HEADED BY HIGINIO "NINO" DIAZ ANE)

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum, dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

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[redacted] said he also has $20,000.00 in Cuban pesos, $7,600.00 of which is in Miami and the remainder in Mexico. [redacted] said he plans to deal in currency and would like to sell these Cuban pesos at a rate of three pesos for one American dollar to DIAZ. [redacted] presumed DIAZ was going to launch an infiltration mission into Cuba and, therefore, would need Cuban pesos. b6 b7C

[redacted] said he would obtain the arms for resale to DIAZ and would also sell DIAZ Cuban pesos under the condition it would be done through a third party and he did not want DIAZ to be aware of his identity.

MM T-2 on May 6, 1968, advised that [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: EJERCITO DE LIBERACION CUBANO (ELC)

DIAZ said [redacted] b6 b7C

DIAZ further stated that he had four small boats but did not further identify them or say where they were located.

DIAZ stated he recently visited [redacted] b6 b7C an independent anti-CASTRO organization in Miami. DIAZ complained that [redacted] had formed a small group within [redacted] and this small group had been using the name [redacted] He has warned [redacted] not to use that organizational name because [redacted] and DIAZ had established a certain amount of good will and prestige and did not want the Cuban colony confused as to the identity of [redacted] group.

DIAZ said that although he gave [redacted] a stern warning he did not know if [redacted] would continue using this organizational name. b6 b7C

"Patria", a Spanish language newspaper printed in Miami, Florida, on April 19, 1968, carried an article saying that the [redacted] announced that organization had joined the Cuban Army of Liberation. [redacted] said the Cuban Army of Liberation will not engage in politics, will be a military group, will receive orders from a civilian junta, would begin a recruiting campaign and would soon start on a fund-raising drive.

MM T-2, on May 2, 1968, advised that [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] a militant anti-CASTRO group which has conducted terrorist activities in the past.

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-24-2025 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/LIMITED DISSEMINATION~~

Miami, Florida

February 14, 1972

RE: JUNTA PATRIOTICA CUBANA
(CUBAN PATRIOTIC GROUP)
[redacted]

b7E

On October 20, 1971, MM T-1, [redacted]

b7D

advised that the Junta Patriotica Cubana (JPC), not otherwise identified, is comprised of twenty men who are former members of Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) and of a group known as the "Officers of Huber Matos", both organizations not further identified.

The JPC is directed by [redacted] who has [redacted]

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MM T-2, a Cuban exile active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past five years, advised that the Officers of Huber Matos is a very small group in the Cuban exile community, has engaged in no significant activities in the United States, and is not well known in the Miami, Florida, area.

MM T-2 advised that [redacted] was [redacted] RECE, a leading anti-CASTRO unity group. [redacted] at the present time, is relatively inactive and has very few followers.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/LIMITED DISSEMINATION~~

Cuban Representation in Exile

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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b7E

[redacted]

RE: JUNTA PATRIOTICA CUBANA

On January 26, 1972, [redacted] b6 b7C employed at [redacted], Miami, Florida, furnished the following information:

He said he had never heard of Junta Patriotica Cubana. He presumed it could be the name of a temporary unity group among Cuban exiles to be used in Puerto Rico on January 27, 1972, for the visit of JOSE FIGUERAS of Costa Rica.

He said that [redacted] b6 b7C an anti-CASTRO organization known as Directorio Revolucionaria (DR). This group consists of some former military men who live in the Miami area, and also former Cuban rebel army officers under the command of HUBERT MATOS. The latter group reside in Puerto Rico and [redacted] is one of the leading members of this group in Puerto Rico.

When the organization was originally formed and the Puerto Rican based Cuban exiles joined the DR, they elected [redacted] Later, b6 b7C a committee was formed to run the organization. Although [redacted]

The political purpose of the DR is to change the attitude of the people in Cuba so that the present Government of Cuba will be overthrown from inside the country.

The Central Committee in Cuba consists of about 100 members and actually runs the country. Of these 100 members [redacted] It is hoped that some of these members, plus people in the armed forces of Cuba and a somewhat disorganized underground movement, will be able to convince the people of Cuba that communism is the wrong system and there will have to be a change in the Cuban Government.

FD-323 (Rev. [illegible])

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Miami, Florida

February 14, 1972

Title JUNTA PATRIOTICA CUBANA
(CUBAN PATRIOTIC GROUP)

Character [redacted] b7E

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above, at Miami.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

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RE: JUNTA PATRIOTICA CUBANA

[redacted] b6 b7C top military officials concerning the support of the DR. These military officials were sympathetic but no significant aid was offered or given.

[redacted] minor Government officials about support for the DR. These officials were mildly interested but did not offer any backing or support.

[redacted] said that although the DR does not maintain any headquarters, military training camps or propaganda activities, it continues in existence and is active in attempts to contact resistance type of people in Cuba. b6 b7C

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RE: JUNTA PATRIOTICA CUBANA

[redacted] said the DR has taken the position that it wants to help and assist political and military leaders in Cuba to make this change in the system of Government in Cuba. The DR wants these minor political figures in Cuba to consider the DR not as Americans who are invaders but as people who want to help in the formation of a new Government. b6 b7C

Communications with people inside of Cuba are difficult and the DR depends on letters and telegrams written in code to communicate with certain contacts in Cuba. Radio telegraph communications with Cuba have been tried, but there is certain difficulty such as the training of telegraph operators and the use of codes. This type of communication has now been discontinued.

The DR avoids publicity and fund raising operations because all has been said that could have been said about the Cuban Government during the past twelve years. The DR has no plans for any military training camps or military operations at the present time.

When [redacted] joined RECE some years ago [redacted] Since the beginning of RECE until the present time, RECE is supported by JOSE BOSCH, President of the Bacardi Rum Company in Miami. b6 b7C

In about 1969 RECE sponsored an expedition to Cuba. Members of that expedition were all killed or captured by the Cuban Government. At that time RECE allocated some of its large contributions and money received from JOSE BOSCH to be given to the widows and children of the members of the ill-fated expedition. After a short time RECE discontinued helping the families of the expedition members. [redacted] Since that time RECE has reinstituted small partial payments to some of the families of the expedition. b6 b7C

On March 22, 1975, SJ T-1 advised that a representative of Jose Bosch had recently met with Orlando Bosch in Chile. At that time, Orlando Bosch had disclaimed any knowlegde of a letter delivered by Aldo Vera. Orlando Bosch stated that he was acquainted with Aldo Vera and [redacted] and that he had given them the assignments to raise money in Puerto Rico for the Cuban cause. Bosch stated, however, that he had not authorized them to send a letter to Jose Bosch requesting any funds. b6 b7C

On May 19, 1975, SJ T-2 advised that Aldo Vera is a member of Accion Cubana. About one month ago Vera was in Miami with Accion Cubana member [redacted] and they were seen buying a large magnifying glass for some unknown purpose. Vera was also seen in the Consulate of Chile in Miami obtaining a visa to visit Chile. It was unknown whether Vera actually made a trip to that country. b6 b7C

On August 9, 1975, Vera was interviewed by representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding his knowledge of Accion Cubana and its leader, Orlando Bosch. Vera advised that he had traveled to Chile sometime in April and May of this year for the purpose of conferring with Orlando Bosch. Vera stated that he has a high regard for Bosch who is constantly seeking funds to carry out is long range plan to liberate Cuba. Vera advised, however, that Bosch has no immediate plans for carrying out any kind of mission.

Vera stated that in the past he has acted as a representative for Orlando Bosch by soliciting contributions from various Cuban exiles who support the general goals and aims of Bosch. Vera stated that he was aware that at one time Accion Cubana bonds were being sold in San Juan and Miami as a means of soliciting funds for Bosch's anti-Castro movement, however, he was unaware of any bonds presently being sold by anyone for this purpose.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Juan, Puerto Rico

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

OCT 20 1975

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY COPIES SERIP(S) OF DATE 9/2/83

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b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-30-94 BY

ALDO VERA SERAFIN
Also Known As

On [redacted] SJ T-1 advised that [redacted] and Aldo Vera Serafin met with [redacted] at which time Vera being the main spokesman made available a letter addressed to Mr. Jose Bosch, President, Bacardi Rum Corporation. In essence, the letter which had the signature of Orlando Bosch (not believed to be related to Jose Bosch) stated that Jose Bosch was being assessed on behalf of Accion Cubana for a contribution of $200,000 "to eradicate communism from Cuba."

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b7C

Accion Cubana is a small Cuban exile terrorist group in Miami, Florida, which has claimed credit for bombings of Cuban embassies in 1974.

SJ T-1 stated that [redacted] immediately and prior to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's meeting with other Latin American officials in Buenos Aires. Source stated that Jose Bosch refused to contribute the $200,000 and that this refusal was passed on to Aldo Vera.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Classified by~~ [redacted]
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification:~~ Indefinite

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Sources whose identities are concealed herein have furnished reliable information in the past except where otherwise noted.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE
DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
ON 6/29/83

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ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 07-29-2025 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Miami, Florida

June 29, 1967

Re: COORDINACION DE FUERZAS (CF) (COORDINATION OF FORCES)
[redacted]

b7E

Representacion Cubano del Exilio (RECE) (Cuban Representation in Exile) is an anti- Fidel Castro organization maintaining headquarters at 1784 W. Flagler Street, Miami.

The military branch of RECE is Coordinacion de Fuerzas (CF). The CF consists of elements of several independent anti-Castro organizations in Miami. These organizations are the following:

Commandos L

30th of November Revolutionary Movement

Brigade 2506

The New Pines

MM T-1 who has furnished reliable information in the past, on June 9, 1967, advised that in early 1967 CF [redacted]

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MM T-1 advised that in April or May, 1967 an internal division developed in CF. Until that [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification [redacted]

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JUL 14 1967 XEROX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Miami, Florida

June 29, 1967

Title COORDINACION DE FUERZAS (CF) (COORDINATION OF FORCES)

Character [redacted] b7E

Reference is made to memorandum dated June 23, 1967 at Miami, Florida.

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Re: COORDINACION DE FUERZAS
ETC.

hit and run raids against the north coast of Cuba with other sub-leaders. CF refused to go along with him. Mas, with his men, equipment and boats pulled out of the Florida Keys.

MM T-2 advised the following boats are of operational interest to CF and had been used by CF in the past:

(1) [redacted] which is a 23 foot Seabird formerly under the control of [redacted] of the 30th of November Organization. This boat has two 110 horsepower engines and is named "Xione." b6 b7C

(2) [redacted] previously under the control of [redacted] has two 150 horsepower engines and is presently in Miami.

(3) [redacted] 31 foot Almon, has twin engines. Its present whereabouts are unknown.

MM T-2 explained that [redacted] b6 b7C

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Re: COORDINACION DE FUERZAS
ETC.

operation was Jorge Mas Canosa, military leader of RECE who changed his mind and decided that hit and run missions against Cuba with press publicity would be more effective. Other elements in CF disagreed with Mas and refused to go along with his new attitude. One such dissenter was [redacted] b6 b7C who wanted to maintain the situation as it was. As a result of this disagreement Mas [redacted]

The 30th of November Revolutionary Movement left CF and some of the Brigade 2506 members withdrew from CF and decided to operate on their own. [redacted] b6 b7C was later demoted to a lower position and [redacted] took over the leadership. [redacted] took the position he would remain in Commandos L, continue to work with that organization but that Commandos L and Mas would no longer cooperate. [redacted] said he would not interfere with Mas' proposed hit and run raids against Cuba, nor would he cooperate. [redacted] felt that after Mas had failed, they could go back to working on infiltration missions again, and [redacted] would then cooperate with Mas.

MM T-2 the Cuban exile who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Jose "Pepin" Bosch, head of the Bacardi Rum Company is one of the leading contributors to RECE and does not participate in the actual day-to-day operations of RECE. [redacted] a Cuban exile and former employee of Bosch in Cuba, [redacted] b6 b7C and says that Bosch is unaware of the politics, internal strife and double dealing going on inside RECE and CF.

MM T-2 explained that [redacted] been working smoothly. However, Jorge Mas became dissatisfied with these operations, wanted to promote

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. [redacted]

Miami, Florida
February 11, 1970

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
ON 9/15/97

b3
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b7C
b7E

RE: JORGE LINCOLN MAS CANOSA
[redacted]

JORGE LINCOLN MAS CANOSA is a Cuban exile living at 4235 S. W. 2nd Terrace, Miami, Florida and is the military leader of Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE), an anti-CASTRO organization having headquarters at 1747 West Flagler Street, Miami.

MM T-1, who has been involved in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past five years, on November 28, 1969 advised that JORGE MAS, military leader of RECE, claimed that it was possible a new Cuban exile political party would be established. MAS said that JOSE "PEPIN" BOSCH might invest a large amount of money to create this political party and possibly use RECE as the military arm of that party.

MAS speculated that if BOSCH did this, money would be spent on RECE to buy large amounts of military and marine equipment to resume military activities and infiltration missions against Cuba.

MM T-1 on January 6, 1970 advised that JORGE MAS said that he and RECE would not publicly oppose the TORRIENTE plan for unification but that RECE would not give TORRIENTE economic or military backing. MAS said that RECE, as a coordinating agency, would be in control of any military operations against Cuba to be carried out by the TORRIENTE plan. MAS said that this was his personal feeling and the majority of executive board members of RECE felt the same way.

MM T-1 explained that JOSE DE LA TORRIENTE is a retired business executive formerly with an American corporation and presently lives in Coral Gables, Florida. In

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

[redacted]

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b7E

ENCLOSURE

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

b6
b7C

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Firebrands Giving Way To Civic-Minded Exiles

REC 18

Third in a Series

By AL BURT
And DON BOHNING
Herald Staff Writers

CUBAN POWER: How Real Is It?

Remember Dr. Jose Miro Cardona?

He was the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council which welded warring exile factions together with U.S. support to field an invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.

Dr. Miro, with U.S. backing the biggest and most powerful leader the exiles ever had, now devotes his life to teaching law at the University of Puerto Rico.

Remember Manuel Artime?

He was the onetime Castro captain and exile leader who had training bases in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, millions of dollars of support and promised an escalating anti-Castro campaign that would sweep him into Havana.

That was in 1964-65. Now Artime has a home in Miami and spends much of his time in Nicaragua in the lumber business. His Revolutionary Recovery Movement (MRR) is a shell.

MIRO

ARTIME

GUTIERREZ

BOSCH

BENES

JUANITA

Remember Manuel Ray?

RAY

Back in 1963, he promised to be inside Cuba organizing a new underground front by May 20, 1964.

The onetime Castro minister of public works disap-

REC 18

NOT RECORDED
167 MAR 6 1968

ST 109

MAR 13 1968

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

9A

The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

Being followed

Date: 2/17/68
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:
RE:
[MM
Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: Miami

☐ Being Investigated

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1 of serials copies made

3-6-78

Re

for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 12-16-77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA) DATE 7-10-95 HSCA SUBTITLE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3/27/84 BY

peared that May and created a furor — until the British Navy enlisted him on a Bahamas island and fined him $14 for trespassing.

Ray now lives in San Juan, Puerto Rico, pursuing a private career as a professional engineer. His revolutionary junta is mostly a memory.

Remember Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo?

He was the machete-thin guerrilla specialist who fought a second front in the Sierra Escambray against Batista while the Castro brothers fought to the east of him in the Sierra Mestra and Sierra Cristal.

In 1964, as Ray and Artime scrambled to see who could fight Castro first, Menoyo got in the race too. He disappeared.

Not until January of 1965 did Menoya surface — in a Castro prison. He infiltrated Oriente Province from the Dominican Republic. For about three weeks he dodged Castro patrols tipped off by informers, then was caught.

On Cuba television, he told a G-2 interrogator:

". . . The only thing left for me is to warn my comrades and friends to think about things well — that what is heard outside of here is quite different from what is seen. . . ."

★ ★ ★

Cause Loses Its Urgency

THESE MEN represented major stages in the political evolution of Cuban exiles. They and others rose and fell, rose and fell. Some were the victims of world politics, some were prey to human weakness, some broken by a task too large.

"Cubans have not joined the Hungarians to cry over a homeland temporarily lost, nor is there any reason for Hungarians to believe that their country will remain captive," Miss Castro said.

Exiles from the Russian revolution, the Spanish Civil War, from Poland, from Czechoslovakia, from East Germany, from China, don't give up either but their cause, if not lost, is dimly heard.

The moderates will not accept, any more than the extremists, that their Cuba vanished like the Old South, gone with the wind, the memory of it more enchanting with each year.

Strangely, they live with but seem to have less enthusiasm for a Cuban colony here which has talent, earning power and growing minority strength in south Florida. Some independent nations in Latin America have less.

It gives Cuban exiles, if they unburden themselves of the old war-politics mentality, the capability of charting a significant new direction.

Today the exiles lack a representative leader and their cause lacks a sense of urgency because Cuba's future depends largely on the world conflict between the U.S. and communism.

A new breed of exile spokesman has emerged. He tends to be more a civic figure than a leader in the political sense. He is a moderate and embarrased by a newly emerged group which calls itself "Cuban Power." He prefers to speak of the larger issues.

One such respected figure, important in Cuba's past and vitally interested in Cuba's future is Jose M. Bosch.

He was once a Cuban minister of the treasury and heads the world famous Bacardi Rum Corporation, a Cuban company which now bases in Miami, Nassau and San Juan.

Bosch makes a realistic appraisal of Cuba but concludes, "I start this year with confidence, particularly because while Castro is a superb salesman he is trying to sell rotten merchandise and whoever sells bad merchandise ends as a bankrupt."

★ ★ ★

Still Time To Organize

BERNARDO BENES, Miami Beach bank executive, echoes equal purpose. He is typical of the new civic breed of exile spokesman.

"I am still confident," he said recently. "There is still time. We need to organize and invest in a plan of action."

Juanita Castro, exiled sister of the Cuban premier, might have been speaking in 1960 or 1961 when she said recently, "In Cuba, the sum of our defeats will turn to victory, the people will rise against their captivity and conquer their freedom. . . ."

Dr. Miro Cardona, the old leader, wrote from San Juan:

"The social phenomenon of exile adjustment is inevitable; but I do not doubt that if Cubans were called for a decisive action, the quarrels that separate and divide them would vanish immediately and they would apply themselves to the fight.

"The Cuban, in conformance with his national character, has no spirit for exile. Yes, he lacks a leader, but that will be overcome in the opportune moment."

What haunts the Cubans, old or new, extremist or moderate, is the story of the Hungarian exiles, who fired into rebellion in 1956 against Russian tanks, lost, and went bitterly into exile complaining the U.S. did not help them at the opportune time.

★ ★ ★

New Direction A Possibility

HUNGARIAN exiles scattered and their concert for the Hungarian cause lost force. Now it is rarely mentioned.

THE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE)

"How to Overthrow the Cuban Communist Regime"

Prepared for: [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-30-98 BY [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

and, seeing that no one was passing by, we seized the opportunity to sprint across the clearing and head back into the thicket. We continued running through the thicket until we reached a second clearing. This clearing was roughly half a mile wide. Upon visually carrying out reconnaissance in that place, I noticed a machine-gun nest situated in the center of the clearing, to my right. I could detect no movement inside the nest. To my left, I spotted another machine-gun nest; again, I saw no movement inside this other nest. A distance of approximately 200 yards separated the two nests, and the terrain between them formed a sort of hollow. I also observed that, beyond the nests, the regime had erected a barbed-wire fence. This fence stood approximately five feet high and spanned a width of about eight to ten feet. The entire width of the barrier was filled with a dense tangle of barbed wire, rendering it nearly impossible to cross.

Seeing no movement whatsoever, neither inside nor outside the nests, we decided to make a dash at full speed between the two nests until we reached the barbed-wire fence erected by the regime. Scrambling over its five-foot height, we threw ourselves across the barbed wires spanning its entire width, leaving behind shreds of our clothing snagged on the wire, along with bits of our own skin. By the time we managed to cross it, we were dripping blood from our hands, legs, and other parts of our bodies.

As they say colloquially: we dug our heels in. We paid no mind to anything else and we kept running toward the fence of the American Base, which lay roughly a quarter of a mile away. Just in front of this fence, a strip of thorny hedge, about eight or ten feet wide, had been planted. Such was our burning desire to get inside the base that we completely disregarded the thorns on this type of plants, clearing the patch in a flash. We scaled the American base fence, a chain-link structure standing approximately nine feet high, and threw ourselves over to the other side, finding ourselves, thank God, safely within the base's territory.

objective being the elimination of the Cuban communist regime: an international communist arsenal and stronghold in the heart of the Americas.

THE EXILE COMMUNITY

The Cuban exile community has progressively shifted from its characteristic state of political banishment toward what can only be described as a mass exodus, as people flee the hell that Cuba has become.

The main reason for this phenomenon is the fact that the liberation of Cuba has not taken place yet. The communist regime, weakened by the fatal flaws of its doctrine, its political thesis, its economic plans, and the resistance shown by most Cubans, has been able to hold on to power due to the complicity of the countries in the Hemisphere which, until now, have adopted a stance of idle observation and compliance with the Cuban communist government.

The logically human reaction of a large segment of the Cuban exile community has been to adopt a watchful stance, waiting for greater possibilities to liberate Cuba.

Some of the most serious frustrations experienced by the Cuban exile community have been:

(a) the lack of solidarity and understanding on the part of the United States government towards the Cuban cause;

(b) the unfulfilled promises in Playa Girón;

(c) the pledge not to invade resulting from the Kennedy-Khrushchev relations during the October 1962 Crisis;

(d) the persecution of Cuban patriots who attempt to risk their lives in the armed struggle against communism;

(e) the seizure of weapons and vessels; and

(f) the lack of dialog and relations between the United States government and a legitimate representation of free Cubans.

All these factors have played a significant role in the lack of militancy among Cuban exiles who consider it necessary to link up with the United States in order to overthrow a regime protected by the Soviet Union.

The indiscriminate use of Cuban citizens by this country's agencies without truly establishing a relationship of mutual respect and common interests based on serious and definitive plans to overthrow Castro is another reason that contributes to the existing crisis between the Cuban people and the United States government. Consequently, the exile community's democratic forces cannot conceal their reservations about maintaining relations with subordinate figures within United States government agencies.

This crisis is further evidenced by the fact that in many cases military officers and government officials of the Castro administration have established contacts and initiated conversations with Cuban exile leaders, which is something they have refrained from doing with representatives of the United States government due to lack of trust.

A militant minority within the exile community that has faith in the Cubans' own efforts and in the future solidarity of the United States government with our cause persists in the struggle against Castro. As far as we understand it, the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) is the most representative and best-organized force within the exile community among those entities that, in conjunction with others on the island, plans and works toward a solution to the Cuban problem, which is predominantly internal in nature.

THE CUBAN SOLUTION

As a matter of principle, and with firm conviction, it is our opinion that the Cuban problem must have a FUNDAMENTALLY CUBAN SOLUTION. A Cuban solution means that the downfall of the Cuban communist regime must be brought about through the Cubans' own efforts. The elimination of communism in Cuba is a matter of concern to all democrats throughout the continent. Nevertheless,

Cuba require the support and solidarity of those Cubans who are fighting from abroad. And in this alignment of forces, the United States should adopt a policy of greater understanding, one that would facilitate the best outcome for said association between the Cubans on the island and those from abroad who wish to support and join those who are fighting there and who need resources.

The United States must not place obstacles in the path of this indispensable coordination of efforts. These efforts, if they are to reach a successful conclusion, require the logistical assistance of the United States government. It is exceedingly difficult and costly for the exile community to acquire the sufficient resources demanded by the internal forces within Cuba.

We limit the United States cooperation to the merely logistical aspect because we understand that for the United States, and for the future of Cuba and that of the entire continent, it is far more beneficial for Cuba's freedom to be won without the United States political and military intervention, which would be disastrous to the ideals and the destiny of the Cuban people, the inter-American principles, and the interests of the United States itself.

In light of the criteria outlined above, we specifically propose the following to the United States government:

IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE:

A dialogue and a close working relationship should be established between high-ranking officials from the United States government and the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE), an organization distinguished by its integrity and dedication to the Cuban cause that commands the respect of the Cuban people. Through this engagement between the United States government and the RECE, the mistake of imposing hierarchies or leaders upon the Cuban people would be avoided. To avoid the repetition of past mistakes, the Cuban exile community's political structure MUST NOT RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES.

This close relationship would help dispel the justified fear that many Cubans have as they do not want the intervention in Cuba of the United States

Armed Forces or the establishment in Cuba of a government chosen by Washington or by the regional agency (the OAS) in the event something unexpected happens, such as Castro's assassination or the liberation of Cuba by other unforeseen circumstances. If the relationship between the United States government and the Cuban people is established (a relationship for which we are advocating in this memorandum), it would be possible to explore projects and potential solutions to unforeseen events such as those outlined in the aforementioned scenarios, as well as other matters of mutual interest regarding the relationship between the United States government and the Cuban people, a relationship that is currently quite deteriorated.

Another advantage would be the considerable strengthening of the Cuban people's fighting spirit upon learning that the United States has reestablished the dialog on the basis of mutual respect with genuinely democratic representatives of the Cuban people.

The provisional government that is to replace the deposed communist regime shall be founded upon a democratic ideology, which would be based on: the absolute respect for freedom in all areas; the restoration of a representative democracy and a market economy; and the pursuit of social justice that encompasses the principles set forth in the Declaration to the Peoples of America contained in the Charter of Punta del Este.

This provisional government shall immediately undertake the imminent tasks of decommunizing Cuba, releasing its political prisoners, and establishing a rule of law that is founded upon the principles set forth in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, it shall generally implement such other measures that are indispensable to channel the country's institutional life and ensure its normal development until it returns as soon as possible to a full and absolute democracy, via the election of its own rulers, and to a market economy, via the re-establishment of all the instruments and mechanisms necessary for those purposes.

In order to ensure the implementation of those political principles, to which the majority of the Cuban people aspire, the United States government—whose assistance is crucial to achieve those aspirations—must establish ties NOW with Cubans who have proven their democratic militancy

and who, by virtue of the conduct they have shown and the principles they have upheld in the struggle against Castro, can guarantee that the provisional government that succeeds the current Cuban communist regime will obey those principles.

It would be most beneficial if a representative group of the Cuban people could count on the solidarity of other governments throughout the Americas. These governments ought to extend assistance and moral support to a people that are COMPLETELY bereft of solidarity, in spite of the fact that they belong to the Americas community. In their misfortune, these people have fallen victim of neglect and the total indifference of all continental governments. Unfortunately, and as a result of the United States leadership in the continent, no Latin American country shall extend its solidarity to a representative group of the Cuban people until the United States takes the initiative and reestablishes its currently non-existent ties with the people of Cuba.

IN THE MILITARY SPHERE:

The appointment of a high-ranking official to serve as a liaison officer between the United States government and the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE). This official must be aware of the plans to free Cuba through the efforts of the Cuban people, as well as of the requirements to bring such plans to fruition.

This collaboration or assistance must be kept in the strictest confidence so that we, Cubans, are the ones solely responsible for the military efforts that must be undertaken to liberate Cuba.

An appropriate selection of personnel to conduct the preliminary organizational tasks, as well as a larger pool of contacts, which this Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE) has initiated and that must inevitably be established with individuals on the island in pursuit of the INHERENTLY INTERNAL solution that we support.

Special emphasis should be placed on the CUBAN nature of all efforts. This is to ensure that the personnel selected in exile, who will

deliver resources to the island, are able to ensure that the plans are being conducted by Cubans who will share the same fate alongside them in Cuban soil.

Being of vital importance for the success of these plans, the United States military collaboration or assistance is to be limited to the necessary logistical support, such as supplying Cuban combatants with weapons, equipment, transportation, and communications so that they are not left stranded on Cuban territory once the fighting begins.

It is necessary to emphasize that the United States participation in these plans should be limited to the following aspects:

(a) logistical support;

(b) provision of intelligence; and

(c) general technical advice.

Therefore, with the United States assistance noted, the Cubans would be responsible for:

(a) contributing the human component;

(b) establishing internal contacts in Cuba;

(c) undertaking the commitments arising from those contacts;

(d) planning the overall strategy; and

(e) leading the further development of military plans.

CONCLUSIONS

This memorandum contains our opinion and thesis regarding the overthrow of the Cuban communist regime, as well as our views on the relationship that should exist between the United States government and the Cuban people on the basis of mutual respect and consideration.

We have attempted to demonstrate, in a a very concise overview, the difficulties that the Cuban people face, as well as the need to achieve, through the implementation of an intelligent and forward-looking policy on the part of the United States, the resolution

of the most serious conflict still afflicting the Western hemisphere: the Cuban conflict.

THE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE)

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THE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ REPORT

Prepared for: Mr. [redacted] b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-24-97 BY [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

FROM: [redacted]

b6
b7C

TO: Militant Bureau of the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE)

REPORT ON THE MISSION ENTRUSTED TO ME BY THE (RECE) TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS AND INITIATE THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ACTIVE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE CUBAN COMMUNIST REGIME IN THE ORIENTE PROVINCE

Orcides Matos and I, the undersigned, arrived on the coast of Cuba on October 21, 1968, at 6:30 a.m. Upon our arrival, we did not find anyone on the shore. We immediately began unloading all the equipment we had with us and put all this equipment, including the boat engine, in caves located in the vicinity of the landing site. During the unloading process, we dropped our water container, which left us with only our two canteens. We kept only the equipment necessary for our personal defense. This included a British 10-10 submachine gun with its respective magazines; an M-2 carbine with its clips; pistols; knives; and several hand grenades. After equipping ourselves and storing the other equipment, we proceeded to sink the boat to prevent it from being discovered by residents or the militiamen patrolling that stretch of coast. To sink the boat, we removed the drain plug to allow water to flood it and tied a heavy iron object to the stern to ensure it sank completely and rested on the seabed. We also secured a rope to the bow, which was tied to the reefs. We believed this would be sufficient to keep the boat submerged. This entire operation took approximately six hours. The distance from where the boat was to the caves where we stored the equipment was about two street blocks. Naturally, the terrain consisted of steep cliffs that were quite difficult to climb.

The next step was to pinpoint our exact landing site. At around noon, we climbed to the top of the cliffs and immediately recognized the location where we were, which was MACAMBO. We returned to where

we had stored our equipment, as it was on our way to the place we wanted to go. Throughout the entire time, we did not see anyone.

At said location, we reconsidered how to get out of there and agreed that the most viable way was by means of the boat itself, because the distance was too great and the route we would have to take to reach Baitiquirí without detection was in very bad condition and nearly impassable. We decided to refloat the boat and we struggled throughout part of the night and into the following day, failing to do so. We were utterly exhausted from our physical exertions as well as from the lack of water, as we only had one canteen each and we had consumed it. Given the impossibility of getting the boat out, we decided to abandon that task and return to our original plan of proceeding on foot, with the aim of trying to locate someone we knew in that area to help us get the boat out or, should that prove unfeasible, to help us transport the equipment that we had stored in the caves to the area where we should conduct the operations we had previously selected.

We set out on October 22, at around 10:00 a.m. We spent the rest of the day walking along overgrown paths that were extremely difficult to traverse: places where not even animals passed. At approximately 7:00 p.m., we reached the place known as BOCA DE YACABO, where the road that goes from GUANTÁNAMO to BARACOA passes through. This place is a hamlet (with about 50 houses) that is located at the mouth of the river of the same name. At this spot, we replenished our water supply without making contact with anyone. We pressed on throughout the entire night subsisting on the cubes we were carrying (which, when diluted in water, made like a bouillon). We woke up on a cattle farm. We took shelter near a river, which in that location is known as PASO DE LAS YEGUAS, where we remained for the entire day resting and sleeping. Our only food during this journey, aside from the cubes, was the fruit of the prickly pear cactus.

We continued our way that night. I should mention that we still had not seen anyone, as we continued to travel through rugged terrain. At around 4:00 a.m., we reached the place known as EL ABRA DE CAUJERÍ, where we made contact with …… and remained for the whole day. Based on his information, we learned about the conditions prevailing in the area. He told us that the militiamen were standing guard, but without weapons; that the militiamen themselves were deeply disgruntled with the communist regime; and that the so-called government informants (snitches) had almost completely vanished, disillusioned by the government's many broken promises. He also told us that hunger in the area was appalling; that all the crops on the farms had been lost as a result of the regime's neglect after seizing the properties from their rightful owners, and because they could not afford the necessary operating costs, given that the government provided them with no assistance. In short, everything was a complete disaster. He also informed us of the deaths of two nephews who had been living with him on the farm. These nephews had been executed by a firing squad because they did not agree with the regime. Our friend's situation regarding food was dire. His family, his wife and children, have almost nothing to eat, yet, making a great sacrifice, they gave us some boiled rice and a little bit of coffee. He also managed to find us a few pieces of sugarcane, which served as food for us. As we were leaving his home at around 7:00 p.m., I gave him 25 pesos. He accepted them but told me that currency held almost no value in that area, simply because there was nothing to buy.

We continued to press on throughout the night, arriving in the early hours of the following day to a place known as EL CAUCERO, a location where large coffee plantations once stood, but which now is dense wilderness and brush. We established contact with ……, who, in turn, contacted my brother and other personnel I indicated. At around 10:00 a.m., …… show up, accompanied by my brother and two other

acquaintances of mine. This team was the very group I had been seeking to return to the site where we had left our equipment in the caves. We rested throughout the day and, that night, we began our return journey through a different route. None of the two individuals, nor my brother, was armed. At around 11:00 p.m., at a place known as EL ALTO DE TOROLICAL, we were taken by surprise by a group of militiamen stationed in a small guardhouse. One of them stepped outside and came within a short distance of us, about four meters away (we were separated by a barbed-wire fence). We could see that he was unarmed, as he held no weapon in his hands. He ordered us to halt but I ignored the command, and we kept on going. Then, a second militiaman emerged from the guardhouse, but this one dropped to the ground as he ordered us to halt. We ignored him as well. A third one then stepped outside and we heard him rack his weapon. He fired several shots and the projectiles whizzed in front of me. Orcides and I immediately returned fire and we observed all three men turn and flee, vanishing into the dense brush. After the incident, Orcides told to me that his weapon had not been functioning properly, as it was firing only single shots rather than operating in automatic mode. Mine, however, worked well.

We kept going throughout that night and, in the early hours of the morning, we returned once again to BOCA DE YACABO amidst a torrential downpour. We crossed the GUANTÁNAMO-BARACOA highway, plunging back into the very same dense brush we had traversed earlier, where we waited out the rain. It was freezing cold and there were swarms of mosquitoes until daybreak. Since we were not carrying our ponchos, as we used them to cover our equipment back in the caves, we were completely soaked. When the sun rose, we resumed our journey until we reached the spot where we had left our equipment. It was approximately 11:00 a.m. or 12:00 p.m. We were in for a shock: the equipment had vanished or, rather, it had been seized. We also noticed that the boat had also vanished. Upon realizing all of this, I immediately decided to vacate the area as

quickly as possible, as I grasped the full gravity of the situation and considered the possibility that an encirclement had been established along the entire stretch of highway between BOCA DE YACABO and IMÍAS. This would have placed us in an extremely precarious position, as we were situated precisely between the highway and the sea, separated from the road by a six-mile expanse of dense brush and thorny thickets. We walked towards BOCA DE YACABO as fast as we could, arriving at this location at around 2:00 p.m. As we crossed the highway, about half a mile away, we observed that the army was stopping every single vehicle.

Although we carried all this out in broad daylight, given the critical situation in which we found ourselves, and out of fear of being inevitably hemmed in, we were able to breathe a little easier once we had crossed the road, as I was almost certain that the encirclement extended from that point all the way to IMÍAS. After crossing the highway and realizing that the original purpose for having the other two guys with me no longer served any objective, I ordered them to return to their respective homes immediately.

The three of us—Orcides, my brother, and I—continued our forced march for another ten minutes until we reached a farmer's house. As I approached the house, I saw a man and immediately realized that I knew him. I called him over to where I was and he told us there was no problem, that we could go to his house. He gave us a tin can filled with sugar water; that was all he had as food. He told me that he had spotted movement by the militiamen (the San Ignacio Militiamen) near his house and had learned that they had discovered a small boat and some backpacks. Naturally, he was referring to the equipment I had left in the cave, unaware that it was precisely our gear that had been seized. Our stay at this farmer's house lasted only a few minutes. We left him 15 pesos and continued our journey toward BAITIQUIRÍ.

At around 7:00 p.m., we arrived at a place known as LA PLAYA DE MACAMBO. We noticed a group of people approaching us. As they drew closer, we could make out that they were fishermen, as one of them was carrying a fishing rod. We posed as militiamen and interrogated them as if

we were a special patrol. They told us the whereabouts of some militiamen, which were precisely the ones tasked with searching vehicles passing along the road. We allowed the fishermen to keep on going and we continued on our way, veering away from the beach toward the cattle ranch we had passed earlier. Upon reaching the ranch, we naturally passed through the brush and halted in the early hours of the morning. We rested, as it was impossible to continue traveling during the day because we were in a terrain where we would have been highly visible.

During the day, while I was resting and contemplating our next move, I decided that the best course of action was to send my brother back to the location where he had been when I sent ..... to look for him at EL CRUCERO, in order to establish through him other contacts that I needed, and to know for certain how the equipment we had left in the cave had been seized. I reached this decision and my brother departed at nightfall. About half an hour after my brother departed, Orcides and I headed out to the GUANTÁNAMO-BARACOA highway, where we flagged down a Jeep traveling to GUANTÁNAMO (three men dressed in civilian clothes were onboard), we were posing as rebel soldiers. We asked them to give us a ride to BAITIQUIRÍ. They agreed to take us without asking any questions. Along the way, as we approached SAN ANTONIO DEL SUR, they talked among themselves and said they had to stop to buy cigarettes. Upon entering the town, I told the driver not to stop. Much to my surprise, they said nothing, and we continued on our journey. After leaving the town, I explained to them that the reason I had told them not to stop was that we had left the BAITIQUIRÍ sub-area without permission to visit a young woman in MACAMBO and, if they stopped in town, we would be recognized and probably be punished severely, and we wanted to avoid that outcome. We apologized for the fact that they had been unable to purchase their cigarettes. I want to state that one of the three individuals in the Jeep was from BAITIQUIRÍ and was an acquaintance of Orcides. He recognized Orcides shortly after we had boarded the Jeep and signaled to him with his hand (a zero) while glancing with his eyes, as if to convey that the other two men were good guys.

We arrived in BAITIQUIRÍ at around 8:00 p.m. The Jeep stopped on the highway where we signaled for it to halt so we could get out. The

other passenger, the one who knew Orcides, got out as well. I asked the driver how much I owed him for the ride, but he told me it was nothing, and they drove on. Orcides and the other young man immediately exchanged greetings, and the latter informed us that the gentleman sitting next to the driver was the Chief of Public Works for the Municipality of Baracoa, a decent fellow, as was the driver. Orcides had known this young man previously as someone opposed to the regime. We discussed the situation: whether there were many armed militiamen; if hunger was widespread; and if surveillance was heavy. In short, we elicited all the information we needed to know in order to continue our journey. Regarding the information we requested, he told us: that there was almost no surveillance; that there was indeed great hardship and hunger; and that significant discontent among the farmers against the regime was evident. We bade him farewell and continued our way to establish the contact we sought.

About 15 minutes later, we arrived at the home of our contact, ……. Orcides approached the house and saw that he was indeed inside with his wife. Orcides called out to him, and he immediately opened the door for us. He asked his wife to boil some plantains and make us some coffee, while we stepped out into a plantain grove to talk away from the house. We asked him the standard questions, the very same ones we had just asked Orcides's acquaintance who had ridden with us in the Jeep. His answers were almost identical. Another question we asked was whether the people in the area were willing to take up arms against the current regime, including the militiamen who were currently unarmed. He gave me a resounding YES that left no doubt as to its truthfulness, for the situation they were enduring had become unbearable.

Our friend's wife let us know that everything was ready, so he went to the house, brought it back (boiled bananas and coffee), and we ate it in the plantain grove. Afterward, he himself took us to a safe place where we spent the night.

The following morning, we were served the same menu as the night before. I asked him if he had anyone he completely trusted, as I

needed to send a telegram from the city of GUANTÁNAMO. He told me he had his brother, and that he was certain he would raise no objections. About two hours later, he returned with his brother. I drafted the telegram (which was the first one you all received in Miami) and handed it to him, along with about 20 pesos to cover his expenses. We remained at that location throughout the day, resting. We discussed the loss of all our equipment in the caves. I asked him if there was any way he could find out—through messengers he might dispatch through the areas of YACABO, IMÍAS, and SAN ANTONIO DEL SUR—how the place where we had hidden our equipment was discovered. He told me he had some men he could send to collect the information I sought. That very day, he organized and dispatched the messengers, who returned later that same day. The reports they brought back were unanimous on the following point: the boat, which we had struggled so hard and unsuccessfully to refloat, had apparently broken free and floated out to sea, whether by the force of the waves or God knows how. It was then spotted by a patrol passing through the area and they scoured the entire area until they finally stumbled upon our equipment, making off with everything, including the engine, aboard the very same boat. Having thus ascertained what we needed to know, and having also completed the task of sending the telegram, we set out at around 7:00 p.m., heading toward EL CRUCERO, where my brother was located.

We walked the entire night, and all the following day and night. We arrived in the early hours, at around 4:00 a.m. During that journey, which took us through the wilderness, we did not make contact with anyone. I went to where my brother was, and he informed me that, through the contacts I had indicated to him, all the information regarding the equipment we had lost corroborated the report that ..... had given us. That day, I saw my father, who came to see me. We talked at length about family matters. At around midday, two individuals arrived to place themselves at my brother's disposal, ready to assist him with whatever he might need. I dispatched one of them to CAUJERÍ to gather all the details regarding the 60 insurgents who had been captured two weeks earlier. Rumors were circulating that a certain man, [redacted] b6 b7C

was the one leading the insurgent group. I want to mention at this moment that [redacted] was an acquaintance of mine, we had fought together during Fidel Castro's Revolution in that area, and I wanted to be certain that it was, in fact, he who was being held prisoner alongside the other 60 men. I also wanted to know whether there were only 60 insurgents in total, or if there had been more, with the authorities managing to capture only 60 while the others had escaped into the wilderness. In short, I wanted to assess how many people had actually risen up in rebellion. b6 b7C

I sent the other man to a place known as LA PIMIENTA to find out, more or less, what was known about said insurgents, and what their objective and the plans they intended to carry out were. At around 4:00 p.m., I sent my father to fetch a man with whom I wished to speak regarding several matters. This man arrived approximately an hour later, and we spoke for about three hours. The questions I asked him, the ones that interested me the most, were the following:

What is the militiamen situation in the area? That is, were they armed? Were they disgruntled? Were they willing to take up arms against the current regime? And what were they doing currently? His responses to these questions were: that all the militiamen were unarmed; that they performed guard duty without weapons; that they were all extremely disgruntled with the regime; that they were willing to rise up if provided with weapons; and that, currently, their only duties consisted of guard shifts walking along the roads, watching over the town shops and schools, and nothing else. Elaborating further, he told me that they were deeply resentful because they had to work by day and do guard duties by night; that they lacked sufficient food; that their clothing was of very poor quality, in tatters; and that they were practically barefoot. In short, they were utterly fed up and ready to do whatever it took to take action against the regime.

Once this conversation was over, I told my father about the various

people I wanted to see the following day. My father left, and we remained deep in the wilderness to rest that night. I don't know how he managed it, but my father brought us food before leaving that night.

The next day, my father arrived early and brought us coffee and some boiled starchy vegetables. At around 10:00 a.m., he brought me the first man. I asked him whether he and the people he knew were willing to take up arms against the regime. His answer was affirmative. I asked him roughly how many men there were throughout the area where he was who would be willing to fight. He told me that he could not give a precise figure, but that he was certain everyone would join in, women included, for the situation was so dire that death was preferable to continuing to live amidst the immense disaster they were enduring and the horrific hunger that he, his family, and their children were suffering.

The first man left, and at around midday, two brothers arrived from a different area than the area the previous visitor was from. These two brothers have another brother who has been living in Santiago de Cuba for some time and is actively engaged in sabotage—such as burning sugarcane fields and schools. They also informed me that he had burned down a factory though, at this moment, I cannot recall what type of factory it was. They explained that their brother was severely lacking the materials needed to carry out the acts of sabotage he wished to undertake. They added that he would be overjoyed if someone could provide him with what he required, namely, explosives, fuses, etc. I asked them if the materials were made available right there, whether there would be a way to transport them to Santiago. They replied that they would have no trouble doing so, as they were accustomed to traveling to Santiago frequently, and their brother was likewise in the habit of visiting them. They asked if I wished to meet with their brother. I told them that I did, but when they informed me that it would take about 15 days, I decided that I could not wait that long. He had, in fact, left the area only a day or two earlier. I reached an agreement with them: if I were ever able to procure the supplies they needed, they

could rest assured that I would provide them to them. They also expressed their willingness to join any form of struggle against the current regime, adding that almost everyone they knew shared this same readiness to act. They departed in high spirits, heartened to learn that efforts were being made from the outside to effect change, and that there was a possibility I might be able to assist them in the future. For the remainder of the afternoon, we did nothing but rest, awaiting the arrival of the two messengers I had dispatched to PIMIENTA and CAUJERÍ.

At around 5:00 p.m., the messenger from LA PIMIENTA arrived. He told me that he had gathered the following information regarding the 60 insurgents: they originated from an organization founded in PURIALES, where they had begun to organize with the objective of seizing the MAMEYAL barracks, a facility housing some 50 or 60 long guns; according to what they told him, this organization had infiltrated the barracks with a considerable number of militiamen who were secretly allied with them and believed they would encounter no difficulty in taking said barracks; the 60 insurgents in question hailed from this organization, but they were individuals who had already been identified and were in hiding to avoid capture. Despite this, the regime captured them, however, the aforementioned organization is still standing. This organization is led by …… and another individual from PURIALES; and, some men still remained in hiding whom the regime had been unable to apprehend, though they are unarmed.

Later, about an hour after the messenger from LA PIMIENTA had departed, the messenger from CAUJERÍ arrived. He informed me of more or less the same details as the previous one, with the distinction that he told me the incident involving [redacted] He told me that on the day the 60 insurgents were captured, [redacted] was not in the group; rather, while the prisoners were being transported to SAN ANTONIO DEL SUR, [redacted] happened to be traveling in a Jeep from SAN ANTONIO DEL SUR toward CAUJERÍ. When the two parties crossed paths on the road, they took [redacted] prisoner, however, he stated that they were mistaken about him, asserting that he had gone to SAN ANTONIO DEL SUR precisely

b6
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to expose the insurgents' conspiracy. Nevertheless, they took him into custody and subsequently released him, some eight or ten days after his arrest. [redacted] current status is that of a "snitch," and consequently, he has forfeited the trust that everyone in that area previously placed in him. Despite everything that has transpired, the lingering question regarding this matter is whether [redacted] made these statements merely to save his own skin or if it was, in fact, true that he was an infiltrated "snitch." b6 b7C

The following day, other individuals who were friends of mine arrived. I had asked my father the day before to let them know that I was there and wished to see them. The conversation revolved around the same subject, and it could be said that it was a carbon copy of everything I had been told by the other people with whom I had spoken previously. We slept that night in the same spot, intending to continue our journey the following day.

The following night, Orcides, my brother, and I set out for BAITIQUIRÍ. We slept and rested the next day at EL ABRA, at the home of ……. We conversed at length about the same matters and, as night fell once again, we resumed our journey to BAITIQUIRÍ, arriving in the early hours of the morning. Throughout the entire journey, we encountered no one: neither militiamen nor civilians. We arrived once again at the house of ……, where we had stopped previously when passing through this place. He informed us that, shortly after we had departed on our previous visit, contingents of troops had begun to arrive in trucks and Jeeps. I asked him roughly how many had arrived and he told me that, based on what he had been able to ascertain and on his own observations, he estimated that about 5,000 soldiers had passed through BAITIQUIRÍ. I asked him where those troops were located now. He informed me that the bulk of them were positioned in a cordon stretching from BOCA YACABO to IMÍAS, and troops had been dispatched to the area known as DUABA, with one company to ALTO DE LOS MULOS and another one to CAUJERÍ. He told me that, according to reports from local militiamen (friends of ……), a firefight had broken out between soldiers who had recently arrived and were stationed at the location known as IMÍAS. He said that seven people were wounded in the skirmish and that the

wounded had been transported to the GUANTÁNAMO hospital. He also informed us of another firefight that had occurred in CAUJERÍ, in which two people were killed: a sergeant and a private.

During our stay, they offered us boiled plantains and coffee. That was all the food they had in that humble home.

I told ..... that I needed to send a new telegram (which was the second one you all received). He told me that he would take care of delivering it himself, as he happened to be heading to GUANTÁNAMO the very next day. I told him that I needed him to go to TORTUGUILLA to tell ..... that I wanted to see him urgently in BAITIQUIRÍ. Naturally, I first asked him what was the stance of ....., and he told me that he remained as rebellious as ever against the current regime. He left on horseback right away, and at about 4:00 p.m., he returned accompanied by .....

..... had previously worked with me as the [redacted] b6 b7C [redacted] when the uprising in IMÍAS took place in 1960. He currently lives in TORTUGUILLA, where he runs a small business selling whatever goods he can procure. Since ..... originally lived in PURIALES, I asked him about the attitude of the people he knew in that area regarding taking up arms and he told me that, with each passing day, the spirit of rebellion was growing stronger, and that the people were ready to take up arms at any moment. The conversation lasted about an hour. I assured him that I was actively working to coordinate the delivery of the weapons and equipment necessary to spark an uprising throughout the entire area. He was very pleased to hear this and urged me to do everything in my power, as the situation was becoming more unbearable with each passing day, and expressed his hope that I would never forget them. We said our goodbyes and he returned to TORTUGUILLA.

I stayed behind with ..... to discuss the same topic and, at nightfall, we set off to GUANTÁNAMO BASE after refilling our canteens and handing over to ..... the telegram that he would forward to Miami the following day. I also gave him a note, along with the corresponding code, so that he could send me telegrams whenever possible to keep me apprised of the situation in the area and of suitable locations for future landings. I told him not to send me any until at least 15 days have gone by. Before departing, we drank coffee and ate boiled plantains.

We set out, heading into the thicket, which was nearly impenetrable, as it was thick with prickly pear cacti and every manner of thorn, including giant cacti, chain-like cacti, thistle, and many others. We walked through the whole night, enduring countless hardships as we hacked our way through the rugged thickets. Dawn broke when we were about two miles north of TORTUGUILLA. We pressed on without resting. The arduousness of the journey left us parched, and the water we carried in our canteens ran out almost immediately. Since we carried no food and were now without water, we sustained ourselves on prickly pear fruit which, being rich in juice, helped to somewhat alleviate our thirst. Every so often, we had no choice but to rest for about 30 minutes, for the sun was scorching, hot enough to "crack stone", and the dehydration and hunger we were enduring were wearing us down and we had to conserve our strength, as there was still a considerable distance left to cover. At around 7:00 p.m., we reached the vicinity of the SANTIAGO-GUANTÁNAMO highway, arriving at a place known as YATERITAS.

We waited about two hours for it to get really dark, as we had to cross the highway and the village of YATERITAS. During this wait, we spotted a small, abandoned house. All that remained of it were the support posts and the palm-thatch roof. In the yard, we noticed a rooster and a hen perched on a bush. We did not pay much mind to them, though we certainly would have liked to get our hands on them.

We set out, crossed the highway, and skirted around the town of YATERITAS. We crossed the YATERAS River and passed by the government farm. We walked by several horse paddocks until we once again headed into the brush and thicket, the point where we believed we had already left behind all the dangerous spots where we might be spotted by the army.

After walking for roughly a quarter of a mile, we were surprised by the army, which ordered us to halt. We immediately threw ourselves to the ground and heard the bursts of fire from the soldiers' weapons. We crawled over stones and thorns, trying to get away from where we were. We could see the sparks generated by the bullets as they struck the rocks. This exchange of gunfire lasted about ten minutes. Judging by the sound and volume of the fire, we could tell that three

automatic weapons were being fired at us. We were unable to determine whether there were additional soldiers present or if it was just those three. Sensing that we were facing an encirclement, I immediately decided to begin the return journey toward BAITIQUIRÍ, despite all the hardships we had endured and the poor physical state we were in due to lack of food and water. Moving at a forced pace, we passed the horse paddocks, the government farm, and the river, where we refilled our canteens. We passed through the town and crossed the highway. We did this quite rapidly, fearing that we might be cut off along the highway. Fortunately, everything went well.

When we passed once again by the spot where we had seen the rooster and the hen, this time we decided to claim the birds for ourselves, managing to take the hen. We headed into the thicket and traveled for approximately three miles, feeling pretty certain that we were not being followed. We decided to spend the night there, because we were utterly exhausted from the ordeal we had just endured. We secured the hen (which, by the way, was quite old) and went to sleep.

The following morning, at around 5:00 a.m., we decided to continue on our way to put a good distance between ourselves and the place where we had been caught off guard. At around 10:00 a.m., we decided to slaughter the hen, and so we did. We had a bit of trouble, as we had no water to pluck its feathers, but we soon had it cleaned and roasted it after digging a pit in the ground and fashioning a makeshift grill out of branches. Naturally, the roasted hen turned out semi-raw, given the very rustic setup we had; nevertheless, it tasted like heaven to us after having eaten nothing but prickly pears for so long. Once we finished our meal, we continued our journey toward BAITIQUIRÍ throughout the rest of the day. By late afternoon, we ran out of water and reverted to eating prickly pears, not so much out of hunger, but rather out of thirst. That night, we arrived back in BAITIQUIRÍ and made contact with ……. We told him everything that had befallen us and explained that that was the reason we had returned.

During the journey from YATERITA to BAITIQUIRÍ, I thought about what should be my next step once I got to BAITIQUIRÍ. After considering various possibilities, I concluded that, given the mobilization of army troops throughout the entire area, the best course of action was to attempt to escape by sea.

In speaking with ……, I asked him if he had the means to build me a boat. He told me that he did not have the appropriate wood, but that near where he lived, the regime was building houses for farm laborers, and that they could try to steal some of the planks to construct the boat. As for nails, he told me he had a few, as well as some putty and screws, enough to be able to build the boat. We devised the following plan:

1- He would immediately go to see a neighbor named ……, who was a carpenter and had built several boats in which some BAITIQUIRÍ residents, including Orcides himself, had made their escape.

2- If the carpenter was willing to build said boat, then the three of us, along with …… and ……, would go to steal the lumber.

Everything was carried out and went according to plan. We transported the lumber about three miles toward the sea, to a location where …… could begin building the boat with the help of ……, without anyone seeing them. The boat building task took about two days. It turned out quite well, not only because …… knew what he was doing, but also because, fortunately, he had the necessary materials and tools to complete it without any risk of water leakage.

The place where the boat was being built was a mile and a half from the sea. On the night of November 12th, the five of us carried the boat until we had positioned it about 200 yards away, hiding it beneath some sea grape bushes so that, the following day, Orcides, my brother, and I could take it down to the sea by ourselves. We returned to the thicket where we spent that night, and the next day (November 13th), at around 2:00 p.m., …… arrived and brought us a five-gallon metal can of water, some boiled plantains, and coffee. I reminded …… about the report he was supposed to send me and handed to him the two pistols along with their respective ammunition. We said our goodbyes, and he departed, telling us that if it became necessary to revolt and go into the wilderness, he now had a weapon to defend himself.

At around 6:00 p.m., we returned to the spot where we had left the boat, and at around 6:30, we loaded the five-gallon metal can of water and our canteens into it. With great difficulty, the three of us hauled the boat

toward the sea, for the area was strewn with sharp coral rocks and reefs where the waves crashed. It was a place with no actual beach; rather, once the reef ended, there was a sheer drop-off into the ocean, which was quite deep at that spot. The waves pounded against the reef, and we took advantage of an incoming wave to shove the boat out toward the open sea. During this first attempt, we found ourselves in a predicament: about two-thirds of the boat was still resting on the reef. I climbed inside the boat, took off my weapon, and placed it beside me, while my brother and Orcides remained standing on the reef. When the next wave rolled in, they shoved the boat forward; this time, half of it remained on the reef while the other half hung suspended toward the sea. At that point, Orcides climbed aboard, set aside his weapon as well, and positioned himself in the center of the boat with the oars at the ready, waiting for the next incoming wave to carry us clear of the reef. My brother remained on the reef to give the boat one final shove and then scramble aboard immediately. When the wave arrived, my brother pushed the boat with all his might and instantly clambered in. Orcides began rowing with every ounce of his strength, striving to get us out as quickly as possible while riding the lift provided by the wave. Unfortunately, the boat did not clear the reef completely before the wave receded and, because the stern was still snagged on the rocks, the bow tipped downward into the void left by the retreating water. The boat capsized with all three of us still aboard, and we tumbled into the water. Despite the darkness, I was able to spot Orcides and my brother in the water nearby. I immediately shouted to them not to worry about the boat, but simply to try to get out however they could.

The undertow from the wave left us situated about three or four yards from the reefs. We began to swim, attempting to reach them, but the effort was immense, as the undertow pulled us back further than we were able to advance. I realized that, with the clothing I was wearing, I couldn't make any headway, so I took off the mid-calf boots that …… had given me, since the pair I had brought from Miami had fallen to pieces during our treks over the rocks. (I was incredibly lucky that, because the boots were quite a bit too big for me, I was able to slip them

off without having to untie the laces.)

Now, relieved of some weight, I was able to make better headway while swimming, and I could see that I was drawing closer to the reefs. I shouted to Orcides and my brother to take off their shoes.

I continued swimming until I managed to latch onto the reefs. When a wave rolled in, I saw my brother grabbing hold of my feet, and in that way, he too was able to secure himself to the reefs. I told him to hold on tight, as I was going to grab onto his feet to see if Orcides could, in turn, grab onto mine; however, it seemed he was becoming even more exhausted than we were, for he had not been able to shed any of his gear, not even his tall boots or cartridge belt. He kept trying to grab on to my feet, which were about one yard from him but, apparently, being already so utterly exhausted and drained of strength, he could not cover the distance, and I watched as he was pulled under by the undertow, and he never resurfaced.

It was a moment of terrible anguish for the two of us, watching Orcides so close to us yet unable to do anything more than what we were already doing, for, being utterly exhausted myself, I dared not let go of my brother's feet as I was certain that, against the force of the undertow, I would not have been able to swim another yard, and convinced that I would surely drown without being able to do a thing for poor Orcides.

After watching Orcides go under, I managed to clamber up my brother's body until I was able to hang onto the reefs. Although everything that had transpired since we fell into the water seemed to have lasted "a 1,000 years," it was actually a matter of only 15 or 20 minutes. We climbed out of the water and remained right there for about 20 minutes, keeping a lookout to see if we could spot Orcides. It was all in vain, we did not see him. My brother and I walked in opposite directions along the shore to continue searching for him, hoping that he might still be alive but, tragically, we did not find him. R.I.P. to this brave brother-in-arms who gave his life for the freedom of his homeland.

For about 15 minutes, we sat upon the reefs, contemplating the great tragedy that had just befallen us while simultaneously planning our next move. Our situation was desperate, for the only things we possessed were the clothes on our backs. I was barefoot and had merely a

single grenade, as a weapon for self-defense, that I carried in my shirt pocket.

We decided that the best course of action was to return to the home of ……, which lay a fair distance from where we were. The journey was grueling, physically speaking, especially for me, as I was barefoot and had to walk over sharp coral rocks and thorns, although we had removed the insoles from my brother's boots and used the laces to fashion a sort of makeshift sandals, which did not last even five minutes walking through that thorny, rocky brush. Despite the pain this caused me, there was no choice but to press on; we simply could not remain in that spot. It was not just because of our thirst and hunger: it was extremely dangerous if the boat or the body were discovered at dawn, we risked being encircled and either eliminated or taken prisoner. Finally, after a grueling struggle, we arrived at ……'s house at around midnight.

We knocked on his door, and he got up immediately. We told him everything that had happened to us, which caused him terrible grief. I immediately asked him to hand over the two pistols I had left with him, as we were unarmed. He gave them to us and immediately set about boiling some plantains for us, which we ate with coffee he also prepared. When he saw the state I was in, my feet bleeding because I was barefoot, he took off the tennis shoes he was wearing (which, incidentally, were about three sizes larger than what I wear) and handed them to me, saying something I will never forget: "WE HAVE LOST A GREAT BROTHER-IN-ARMS, BUT WE MUST KEEP FIGHTING, FOR WE MUST PUT AN END TO THESE SCOUNDRELS." He gave us some cigarettes and matches.

During our brief stay—about an hour—at ……'s house, I had decided what my next step would be, namely, to head toward the GUANTÁNAMO BASE. I asked …… to walk me to the edge of the highway; since it was nighttime, I did not want to waste much time finding it, and I knew he could guide me there directly and quickly, even though he was barefoot. The stretch of ground was nearly half a kilometer long. We said our goodbyes before crossing the highway, then we crossed it and headed once again into the brush.

We walked all that night and until 4:00 the following day, when we reached the outskirts of YATERITA, where we waited for nightfall to cross the road.

When we left ……'s house, we departed exactly as we had

arrived, the only difference being that we now had tennis shoes, a few cigarettes, and some matches. We carried neither food nor water; as for the water, we simply had nothing to carry it in. Throughout the entire journey from BAITIQUIRÍ to YATERITAS, we sustained ourselves on prickly pear fruit and the water that Bromeliads hold within their central reservoir. This water accumulates whenever it rains. Since it had not rained in quite some time, the water was foul, putrid, and black in color; yet we had no choice but to drink it, for we deemed it preferable to quench our thirst and risk falling ill.

We crossed the highway running through YATERITA at a point situated about two kilometers closer to GUANTÁNAMO than where we had crossed it during our last visit to YATERITA. We reached the river and drank plenty of water, because we were terribly thirsty. Although, as I mentioned earlier, we had crossed the highway about two kilometers closer to GUANTÁNAMO and, after crossing the river, we still had to pass through the regime's farm. This farm covers a rather extensive area. We reached the horse paddocks once again and veered off to a spot well away from the location where we had previously encountered the regime's forces.

We headed back into the thicket and walked throughout that entire night, continuing through the day until at around noon, when we reached the vicinity of the GUANTÁNAMO NAVY BASE. Throughout this entire undertaking, our diet remained identical to that of the previous day, that is, prickly pear only, for there were no Bromeliads to be found there and, consequently, we drank no water.

I saw that I was approaching the edge of the thicket, as I could make out a clearing. I cautiously peeked out and observed a stretch of open ground, about a 100 yards wide, across which ran a dirt road. I also spotted a guardhouse manned by two militiamen who were chatting. I ventured about a 100 yards deeper into the thicket, and we proceeded westbound in a straight line for over 100 yards. I peeked out toward the clearing once again and saw a militiaman walking eastbound carrying a rifle. Once more, I went into the thicket and walked over 100 yards. I looked into the clearing again and saw another guardhouse, also manned by two militiamen. I continued this operation for over an hour. Then, peeking out one more time, I saw neither guardhouse nor militiamen. We remained watching for a prudent interval, about five minutes

THE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE)

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CENSUS AND STATISTICS:
[redacted]

February 17, 1969

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TO: [redacted]

FROM: The Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE)

SUBJECT: How to Overthrow the Cuban Communist Regime

INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1969, the Cuban communist government marked its TENTH YEAR in power. Over those ten years, the Cuban people have suffered the most ruthless dictatorship that the Americas have ever endured.

Their freedoms have been curtailed. The hardship that the Cuban people have suffered on every level is unparalleled in the Americas history.

The entire hemisphere, the United States included, has been shaken by the turmoil and communist subversion emanating from the formidable base and sanctuary of the island of Cuba. The political instability suffered by Latin American nations and, consequently, the stagnation in their economic and social development are the result, in large part, of ten continuous years of the Castro-communist intervention in the internal affairs of the countries of the Americas. The tactics have changed and taken multiple forms, based on local circumstances and nation-specific characteristics. Guerrilla fronts in the mountains, organized violence in urban areas, infiltration of educational institutions and government structures, and looting and unrest in cities—allegedly due to racial strife, have been some of the tactics and methods organized, encouraged, or managed from Havana that Fidel Castro has employed throughout the continent.

It is therefore imperative that a policy be implemented, with the